Air Defence in Northern Europe

CONCLUSIONS

All of the countries examined here can be included among the nations which are aware of the importance of air power and have typically devoted continuous efforts to keeping their air defence assets up to date. Their historical and economic backgrounds have naturally left a definite mark on the air defence solutions adopted by each.

Finland’s Air Force was created in the midst of the War of Independence, and prompt action was needed. This eliminated effectively any administrative jealousies. The principle of establishing it as an independent branch of the armed forces therefore seemed natural.

In Norway the advances made in aviation technology were fairly soon taken into the service of the already existing Army and Navy organizations, an arrangement which, once established, was naturally quite difficult to dissolve. Thus this organizational principle continued up to the Second World War.

In Russia, military aviation was initiated by the Imperial Army well before the First World War and was substantially extended during the war. Activities were interrupted by the Bolshevik revolution, but importance was soon attached to it by the Soviet regime as well. The Air Force as organization was nevertheless confined to a subordinate status in the Party-Army hierarchy.

Military aviation had very similar beginnings in Sweden as it did in Norway, but the question of an integrated air organization was resolved sooner, and thus an independent air force was established seven years after the First World War.

Anti-aircraft artillery started out as an Army function in all of these countries. It was then transferred to the Air Force in Finland and Norway, but in the case of Finland it returned to the Army after the Second World War. In the Soviet Union it became part of the independent air defence branch, while in Sweden it has always been the responsibility of the Army.

The early development phase in Finland was characterized by sound plans but inadequate implementation. Motivation towards armed defence was high among the people, as shown by the voluntary training undergone by the Home Guard and the Air Defence Association. On the other hand, the political will for material investments in defence remained low even during the threatening years of the late 1930s. Thus the well balanced program was suddenly exchanged for a series of emergency aircraft purchases once the Winter War had broken out.

The special needs of the Army and Navy very much dictated the early development of their respective air corps in Norway, which did not provide an ideal basis for building up a national air defence doctrine or acquiring the proper equipment.

In the Soviet Union the subsequent pattern of development was dominated by a big country’s ambition for big numbers, with the Army very much dictating the organizational philosophy, doctrine and material development of air assets.

Quite detailed development objectives were laid down in Sweden after the founding of the Flygvapnet. International douhetism with very heavy bomber priorities was in evidence in these plans. But the necessary resources were not granted in Sweden, either, and the organization was poorly equipped when military activity started to break out in the neighbouring countries.

The lessons of the war for Finland were straightforward enough:

• There was no guarantee in counting on foreign help, the country has to be ready to face any challenge alone.
• One can fight successfully even against apparently impossible odds given sufficient determination and quality.

Norway experienced occupation by the Germans and then liberation under the allied forces. Thus the NATO alliance was a natural choice for the country’s post-war defence arrangements.

The Soviet Union failed to reach its objectives on the northwestern front in both the Winter War and the Continuation War, but even after the heavy losses inflicted by Germany it was able, as part of the allied forces, to occupy eastern Central Europe. The extremely deep area of defence, a heavy emphasis on quantity and the importance of international support from allies were among the main war lessons. As a result, the Warsaw Pact organization and the steering of industry towards military production were the Soviet Union’s defence solutions after the war.

Sweden had a ringside seat, as it were, for watching the war raging around the country. The natural reaction was to build up a preemptive force to maintain the country’s neutrality and keep it out of any crisis.

The post-war development of air defences in Finland was characterized by a modernization program which started out rather slowly but then pressed forward steadily. A certain amount of progress has been made also in matters of quantity, and this overall build up has been an important motivator in terms of both recruitment and job satisfaction.

Norwegian air defence programs have been part of the NATO build-up, and have advanced accordingly. Now, with the ending of the Cold War, there have been signs of reduced alliance commitments on the northern flank. This will shift the emphasis more onto national initiatives and programs, although the NATO system will no doubt maintain a high level of integrity.

The Soviet Union’s massive air defence build-up has given way to substantial reductions in present-day Russia, brought about by the implementation of international agreements and the economic situation in the country. A certain quality shift can be perceived in this reduction process, as it is inevitably being concentrated on older equipment. There seem to be notable difficulties in initiating new projects, however, and the quality of training is also suffering at present.

The extensive air defence development program carried through during and after the war in Sweden culminated in the 1960s, after which the first signs emerged that the system was becoming too expensive to maintain. This marked the beginning of reductions, which are planned to continue in the future. These have been carried out gradually and in a controlled manner over a long period of time, and thus there has been no dramatic downgrading of the status of the Swedish air defence. Actually, the effect among the personnel must have been more psychological, as they have seen many traditional units and functions disappear.

The contemporary air defence organization in Finland is based on the lessons learned in the war. The limited manpower resources of a small nation, matched with the need to maintain a good level of manning in combat units, have eliminated the multi-layered areal staff system with its large liaison personnel.

Each branch has its own operational, material and training responsibilities, and decisions are made without delay at most professional levels. This system emphasizes effectiveness and calls for good cooperation between the commanders in the various branches. It was applied during the critical summer of 1944 and worked well.

Norway’s air defence structure is part of the NATO joint command system and is organized accordingly. The readiness to adapt to major changes in force levels is one of the capabilities needed in the allied management environment.

Russia has divided its air defence resources vertically into branches and horizontally into districts. An initiative has originated from the air force to streamline the organizations and concentrate the deployment of forces. This is an expected objective in the effort at rationalization in context of the major post-Soviet transformation.

Sweden has a tradition of areal commands with units that serve well to cover the entire country. The numbers of both areas and units have decreased, but the original organizational principle persists. Air assets are administered in two organizations; personnel and training in the Air Force Department and material and equipment in the Defence Materials Establishment (FMV). The Commander of the Air Force has initiated an effort to streamline the command structure towards a more flexible and effectiveness-oriented type; actually very much to the same which is used in the Finnish Air Force.⁴⁹

There are many sectors of air defence which have not been touched upon in this review. One is electronic signals surveillance, which is an important part of the total air surveillance system. All of the countries in question have their unique solutions in that area, and also seem to assign it fairly high priority in every organization.

Another is the system of bases, which very much dictates the flexibility of air operations. This has been considered carefully in every country and certain national or allied characteristics are visible in these structures. Finland and Sweden use their wide areas of countryside and make use of public roads as landing strips, whereas Norway and Russia favour large bases with a high input of local resources.

The aviation industries in all these countries have designed and produced original aircraft types, and have also built many foreign designs under license. Differences in national philosophies have begun to develop in this respect since World War II however. In Finland the home market was estimated to be too small to support continued economic production of fighter-class aircraft, whereas the war had shown the importance of autonomous maintenance, repair and modification capabilities. Thus the aviation industry is integrated into the Air Force’s technical system, constituting a vital part of it.

In Norway the equipment received from NATO gave no room for local production, and the aviation industry was adjusted to support the allied technical organization.

In the days of the Soviet Union the aviation industry was a part of superpower competition, and this meant that considerable resources were devoted to it. In present-day Russia, however, with declining order books, a kind of survival game is going on in the aircraft industry, although it is clear that there will be some survivors.

In Sweden, large domestic orders gave a good basis for the development and production of tailor-made aircraft types on a national basis, but gradually the economic burden has become heavier, so that the cost structure of the JAS 39 Gripen project has aroused a national debate. The government and the military are nevertheless committed to the JAS.

It is obvious that there will be only three instances capable of genuine fighter development and production in the future: the USA, Russia and some kind of European cooperation group.

The importance of air power, and accordingly that of air defence, has aroused many traditional attitudes in leadership circles. The major strategic and operational lessons from the Gulf war are as follows:⁵⁰

• Strategic attack works
• If a nation loses air superiority, it is at the mercy of its attackers; its military operations are highly circumscribed
• Surface forces are vulnerable and fragile
• Surface operations in the face of enemy air superiority are almost impossible
• Precision and stealth redefine mass and concentration
• Asymmetric attack works and gives huge advantages to the attacker
• Air forces can defeat large surface forces by themselves
• A static force takes longer to destroy from the air than a mobile force
• Rapid exploitation of information is essential
• Standard hierarchical organization is not conductive to rapid processing and exploitation of information
• Airpower has become the dominant force in war.

Many observers look askance of airpower because they believe it costs too much. To the contrary, high tech airpower is extraordinary cheap when the cost is measured against the results. The only measure which makes sense today is the effect one can produce on the opposition. And nothing can match airpower when the accounting is done correctly.⁵⁰

Competent politicians and officers have realized the nature of the modern dynamic conflicts, and many air defence modernization programs can be seen to be in process in northern Europe. Modern material and equipment of good quality is essential in the extremely unforgiving arena of aerial warfare, but the most important force multiplier continues to be carefully selected, well motivated and thoroughly trained combat-ready personnel. The key factor for any country is to maintain steady standards of personnel quality and to ensure this by means of good training with a diversity of exercises and plentiful flight hours. Any country that is capable of this can look to the future with confidence. Certain material improvements can be made once a conflict has started, but personal skills must be available at once. Only the winners will be there to continue the fight, as coming in second in an aerial engagement means loss, and the ability to continue air combat with success is a necessity for total defence.

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