|
|
Col Richard "Zimbo" Lorentz - the creator of the Finnish Fighter Arm, Page 2
Commander of Flight Regiment 2 during Winter War 1939-40
Richard Lorentz walked from Utti railway station to Flight Regiment 2 (Le.R 2) HQ on 10 October 1939 as the new commander of the regiment. He went to the commander's office and told boldly to his predecessor Rainer Ahonius: "I will now take the command of Flight Regiment 2 and you will travel immediately to Kauhava". The predecessor insisted on having all official document signed where to Lorentz replied: "This is war. We'll just sign the transfer of authority. You will pack in order to make the noon train to Kauhava from Kouvola railway station". Now things moved to a new gear; already on the next day a detachment of Fokkers was flown to a new alert base at Immola.
Col Lorentz restricted the Fokker squadron flights to a radius of 50 km from Immola in order not to provoke the opponent. The radius allowed just the protection of the railways. The Finns were not given the permit to open fire even if they met fighters with red stars in the middle of Karelian sky. They weren't going to give any excuse to start war.
Lorentz was a familiar figure in the squadron briefing rooms. He used to check the ready room lectures and the mission debriefings. Before the war the allowed fuel quota for the fighter squadrons was surpassed - Magnusson and Lorentz just made the decisions that were needed. In mid-November Lorentz briefed Fighter Squadron 24 pilots on the situation. He mentioned that he had been in touch with the Finnish radio intelligence expert Reino Hallamaa who had mentioned that the intelligence information suggests that the Russians had completed all troop movements and were ready to attack within two weeks or even earlier. From that day on Flight Regiment 2 was in full alert condition.
In late 1939 it became evident that the legendary leader of Finnish radio intelligence Reino Hallamaa and Richard Lorentz had a very close relationship. This tracked back to 1937-38 when Finnish Air Force Officers were used on the islands of the Gulf of Finland in radio intercept duties. In November 1939 the relationship between Richard Lorentz and Reino Hallamaa turned out to be extremely useful since the regiment got the information that the enemy was ready for attack and LLv 24 was keeping the appropriate readiness state. LLv 24 was very careful in avoiding any provocative incidents with the Russian Air Force. The squadron was not allowed to open fire even during incidents where they would have been fired upon.
Capt G.E. Magnusson
Capt E. Heinilä
On the eve of the war Flight Regiment 2 had 31 Fokker D.XXIs in LLv 24 and 10 Bristol Bulldogs in LLv 26 to handle the whole fighter defence. The Fokkers were slow, but the Bulldogs were even worse since their top speed was 50 km/h slower than the speed of the Soviet bombers.
LLv 26 Bristol Bulldogs lined up before the war. In Winter War the biplane was seriously outdated and could not be used for frontline fighter duties. Luckily Lorentz was cautious enough not to send the Bulldogs on one-way daylight missions over the front.
In spring 1939 the Finnish Army came to the conclusion that there was to be a unified Karelian Isthmus Army commanding the army corps. Therefore Flight Regiment 1 (LentoR 1) HQ was formed. The squadrons were put under the command of the regiment and assigned for the army corps, which was new and raised suspicions. IV Army Corps had its own Air Component Commander Lt Col Viljo Valdemar Rekola responsible for operations north of Lake Ladoga. Flight Regiment 2 (LentoR 2) and LentoR 4 stayed under the command of Lt Gen Lundqvist and were in the use of the Commander-in-Chief Marshall Mannerheim. Lt Gen Lundqvist was made the Commander of Air Defence Forces comprising of the Air Force and the Air Defence Forces (AAA). His deputy was the commander of the AAA forces, Col F. E. Helminen, who became the commander of the air force after the Continuation War (another army officer without any aviation background).
The Magnus effect in attacking bombers
On the 1st of December 1939 Richard Lorentz gave a speech for the pilots of fighter squadron 24. He mentioned that everyone should attack he furthermost bomber in the formation first based on technological information he and Capt. Magnusson together with Capt. (eng) Aalto had figured out that the so-called Magnus-effect forced the bullets sideways out of their trajectory. If the bomber gunners fired sideways to the bomber flight path the rotation of the bulled combined to the airflow would disturb the flight path of the bullet and make it inaccurate and ineffective. Therefore the tactic was to attack the furthermost bombers in the formation first to have them firing to their sides. When the Finns started examining the hits that their fighters had received they found to their surprise several bullets that had hit sideways the fighter fuselage - the Magnus effect theory was proved right in practice. In the evening of 1 December Lorentz ordered in the hangar at Immola the day to be the anniversary day of Fighter Squadron 24.
Richard Lorentz inspected Lt Vuorela's Fokker detachment at Suur-Merijoki on 3 December 1939 . The mission of Vuorela's unit was to provide cover to the city of Viipuri (Vyborg). They had been successful in intercepting SB-2 bombers and now Lorentz was afraid that the enemy would make a concentrated attack against the Suur-Merijoki base. The maintenance was difficult at the base and air surveillance messages were late in coming. These factors caused Lorentz to make a decision to move Vuorela's unit to Lappeenranta. Lorentz discussed the issue with Magnusson and 8.30 on the morning of the 4th Vuorela's unit got the orders to fly to Lappeenranta.
Lt Jalmari "Jaska" Vuorela scored the first Finnish Air Force wartime victory by shooting down an SB-2 bomber west of Lake Kämäräjärvi on 1 December 1939. The time was 12.05 local. A piece of this bomber is kept at Fighter Squadron 31, Rissala AB. Vuorela was a sturdy pilot who did great achievements during the Winter War. His fate was a flight in poor weather only two months after the war had started.
A flight regiment headed by Col Yrjö Opas was formed to support the Karelian Isthmus Army. The group was subordinated to the Commander of the Karelian Isthmus Army and its headquarters was moved to the same location as the army HQ at Imatra. Co-operation worked with the army HQ, but there was friction when the army HQ thought of Col Opas as the army air component commander and the Flight Regiment HQ as the aviation office of the army HQ. Col Opas saw the Flight Regiment HQ to be a separate independent headquarters supporting the army, which became the prevailing mode of operations. Long-range aviation, meaning the bombers of Flight Regiment 4 and the fighters of Flight Regiment 2 were kept under the direct supervision of the General Staff for the whole duration of the war.
When the war started the civilian population became acutely interested in air defence since the Soviets immediately started bombing Finnish towns and cities. Fighters were needed to protect the population. The field army had its own interests, but they were strangely limited since the General Staff and the army corps HQs were mainly interested in reconnaissance and artillery spotting missions. We were at the level of 1914 when it came to utilizing modern weapons. Finnish army commanders saw the enemy air operations to be somewhat "unlawful" and the ground operations to be only "lawful" means of warfare. Therefore they were not so much interested in aerial warfare - they just wanted the fighters to perform a sort of a "police operation" to keep the skies clear so that they could concentrate in their ground operations.
On the 6th of December Magnusson was promoted to major and the squadron got new orders that required deployments. On the same day major Raoul Rene Harju-Jeaunty (on the right) took command of LLv 26 and moved to Utti in order to prepare the unit for the Italian Fiat G.50 fighters. The main part of the squadron stayed at Immola while one flight deployed to Lappeenranta and one to Utti. On the 7th Det Vuorela got back to Lappeenranta and the rest of the squadron to Immola. The squadron was given geographically limited patrol areas which didn't please Magnusson who favored the centralized use of his fighter assets.
On 9 December the fighters were based as follows:
Lt Vuorela with 13 Fokker D.XXI (FR) at Lappeenranta
Capt Carlsson with 6 Fokkers at Mensuvaara
Lt Berg with 6 Bulldogs (BU) at Mensuvaara
Maj Magnuson with 12 Fokkers at Immola
LLv 24 Fokkers engaged in several air combats on 19 December scoring ten bombers and two fighters. Very soon the Fokker would turn out to be slower than the Soviet I-16 and to have poorer climb performance and less agility. The Soviet fighters had armoured seats for the pilots and the 7,7 mm Browning could not penetrate the armour. Lorentz admitted that it had been a mistake to optimize the Fokker armament only against bombers. A 13 mm Browning might have been a good solution for the Fokkers. The Finnish ground forces commenced a counter-attack on 23 December. Le.R 2 was ordered to provide cover for the army troops. Air-to-ground operations with fighters were forbidden and it was advised not to activate fighter operations too early since enemy air operations were anticipated to pick up and threaten Finnish logistic lines. At the end of December major Niilo Jusu (on the right) was ordered to form a new fighter squadron, LLv 28, which was planned to receive the French Morane MS.406 fighters.
Finnish Air Force order N:o 19 on Christmas Day 25 December 1939 ordered LentoR 2 to send two Fokker flights to Värtsilä to cover Group Talvela and IV Army Corps. Detachment Luukkanen was formed with eight Fokkers, which equals one flight supported by a four-ship. Richard Lorentz felt the responsibility for Karelian Isthmus defence and after a discussion with "Eka" Magnusson he decided to send a four-ship instead of another flight. Luukkanen's flight engaged five SB bombers on Christmas Day and shot down four. Two days later they shot down two more bombers and on 5 January another three. Det Luukkanen kept scoring; on January 16 and 19 they shot down one aircraft and on 20 Jan four.
When the enemy seemed to keep up bombing Immola Lorentz moved his regiment HQ to Joutseno on 27 Dec. The enemy kept flying bomber "cargo" continuously over Joutseno. As a response Lorentz ordered Magnusson to move his squadron HQ to Joutseno and to move his Fokkers from Immola to Joutsenonlahti. Now the fighters operating to Karelian Isthmus were at Ruokolahti and Joutseno as 11-plane units. Detachment Luukkanen's deployment to Värtsilä kept dragging on so Magnusson tried to use Lorentz to get the unit back to Karelian Isthmus. Lt Gen Lundqvist denied the relocation. As a result Magnusson's Fokker squadron was now dispersed in four bases, which hampered Magnusson's idea of centralized fighter operations over Karelian Isthmus.
One evidence of the working relationship between Reino Hallamaa and Richard Lorentz was Lt Jorma "Zamba" Sarvanto's incredible score on 7 January 1940. After New Year's Eve the enemy long range reconnaissance aircraft flew in the vicinity of Jyväskylä and Kuopio. Radio traffic reported the weather over the cities. One plus one equals two so Lorentz had a discussion with Magnusson after which Lorentz made a decision to put a Fokker flight on alert at Lahti and Utti. On the 7th of January they hit jackpot when the whole eight-plane DB-3 formation was destroyed. Sarvanto scored a world record by shooting down six bombers in less than five minutes. The Finnish radio intelligence had broken the Russian IFF procedure and the Finnish fighters utilized this information when approaching the Russian bombers. After Sarvanto's achievement the Russians ceased operating bombers without fighter escort. This had a profound effect on the Finnish fighter operations. The fighter aircraft that were located at Utti were all moved to Karelian Isthmus on 7 January 1940.
Lorentz thought that the focus of the Finnish fighter defence was on the Karelian Isthmus where the air war would be lost or won. Lorentz tagged his HQ along Magnusson's Fighter Squadron 24 to the end of January 1940. The commander of the Finnish Air Force Lt Gen Lundqvist ordered Lorentz to move his headquarters to Selänpää airfield just north of Kouvola for the duration of activating new fighter squadrons. Unfortunately the communications were poor to Selänpää so Lorentz couldn't help Magnusson and his Fokker squadron as much as he would have wanted.
On 10 January Lorentz and "Joppe" Karhunen discussed while walking in front of Fighter Squadron 24 Fokkers on Joutsenonlahti ice. Lorentz was bitter about the pre-war fighter purchase decisions. In the spring of 1939 the representative of the US Curtiss factory had offered a squadron of Curtiss fighters for the Finnish Air Force. The fighters had an exceptionally good climb performance. Unfortunately the Finns didn't make the deal. After that Lorentz showed Karhunen a photo of a chubby Brewster fighter and mentioned that there was a deal going on to purchase Brewsters from the USA. Lorentz mentioned that he had thought that Karhunen would be the man to test fly and accept the Brewsters somewhere in Sweden. Lorentz had already thought of Karhunen as the one to test fly the Fiats in Italy, but Tapani Harmaja was sent instead. On 9 February 1940 Karhunen got orders to report at the Air Force procurement department. Two days later he was on his way to Trollhättän, Sweden. Only five of the 44 Brewsters made it to Finland before the end of the Winter War. On 10 Jan 1940 F19, the Swedish voluntary regiment commenced operations in northern Finland with twelve Gloster Gladiators and four Hawker Harts. A new LLv 28 was formed at Utti and moved to Säkylä to receive 30 French Morane Saulniers between 4 and 29 Feb 1940.
The Russian Air Force pressure against the frontline caused a lot of requests to use the own fighter force. It was hard for the army officers to understand why the successful fighters weren't used to support them directly. On the other hand the same fighters were urgently asked to support the cities from the Soviet air terror. Industry and railway traffic were hampered because of the bombings.
External tanks came as a total surprise to the Finns
In order to avoid losses it was decided right from the start of the war to use the fighters to provide cover for targets deep inside Finnish territory, especially on the Karelian Isthmus. Only on exception would the fighters be used close to the front. Even this strategy proved difficult when the enemy developed its fighter tactics. Initially the Soviets had used bomber formations without fighter escort, but when the Soviet Air Force started using fighters deep in Finnish air space in late January 1940 the Finns had to respond with larger fighter formations and top cover against enemy fighters. An especially nasty and a complete surprise to the Finns was the addition of external fuel tanks to the Soviet fighters in January resulting in better range for deep operations. The Soviets even started to patrol over Finnish fighter bases in order to hit the fighters when they were taking off and still vulnerable. All this resulted in useless fighter combats from which the outnumbered Finns had to disengage with their inferior fighters. It didn't make sense to engage in decisive air battles with inferior numbers. The Finnish plan called for using the fighters primarily against bombers for which they suited well. Lorentz had to abandon the fighter combat principles of the Air Warfare Manual, but the planned rear attack tactics against the bombers worked as planned. This was a tactic that was not favoured abroad, but a combination of fast aiming and accurate fire proved effective.
On 25 January 1940 Lt Col Lorentz wrote the Commander of the Finnish Air Force Lt Gen Lundqvist: "LLv 24 has continuously flown intercept missions, whereupon I have insisted that my previous order to avoid fighter-to-fighter combats with the enemy must be followed. The squadron has escorted at times some LentoR 1 reconnaissance missions close to the front, but they have been ordered to abort the mission if a superior number of enemy fighters enters the area."
"There have been some disagreements about fighter operations and possibilities to operate with the Karelian Isthmus Army Air Component Commander. It seems that he hasn't been lately fully aware of the operating possibilities of LLv 24. He suggested that the main mission would be to repel bombing missions at Taipaleenjoki and Summa thereby advising LLv 24 commander major Magnusson to move his base closer to the front. Though such an idea for fighter employment is understandable from the Karelian Isthmus Army point of view and even natural thinking, I have strictly ordered LLv 24 commander major Magnusson not to follow such orders based on advise received from the Commander of the Air Force. Also IV Army Corps Air Component Commander has brought forward such exaggerated requests. I have advised Lt Luukkanen to restrict his operations."
"I think that it would be useful to advise the Air Component Commanders that small numbers of fighters can only act based on air surveillance alert information e.g. further back from the front. Closer to the front you need constant combat air patrols - stronger force to oppose the enemy. Even if the enemy uses bombers in waves the opposing fighters can be used only in short periods, if the enemy fighters don't prevent that. It isn't useful to move the fighters closer to the front since they would have to do their initial climb from the base in the view of enemy fighters and that would cause substantial losses."
Lt Gen Lundqvist agreed with Lorentz and didn't approve the idea of moving fighter bases closer to the front. In late January 1940 Lorentz moved his headquarters close to Kouvola to support the formation of new fighter squadrons.
The Gladiators arrive
In late January the first four Gloster Gladiators arrived for LLv 26. South Africa had donated the aircraft and they were taken into operational use since the arrival of the 25 + 10 Fiats was delayed from November 1939 to early 1940 because Swedish newspapers broke the news about the Finnish - Italian fighter deal and the fighters that were already on their way in Europe were turned back from the Germany and had to be reshipped from Italy via Gibraltar and Gothenburg (Göteborg) to Finland. The first two Fiats arrived in late December 1939, the next batch of 14 fighters in February 1940 and 12 more in March. The last one arrived in June 1940.
South African Gladiators to Finland in 1940
On 30 January Lt Gen Lundqvist ordered the combat ready LLv 26 Gladiators to be moved east where detachment Luukkanen was to be moved together with the main part of LLv 24 on the Karelian Isthmus. LLv 24 had to move a detachment of ten fighters to southwestern Finland to relieve the Bulldogs for training purposes. Detachment Ahola (previous Det Vuorela) flew to Littoinen, near Turku (Åbo), with ten Fokkers. The mission of LentoR 2 remained to provide air cover for Karelian Isthmus, IV Army Corps and Group Talvela logistics centers and lines of communications.
Based on the orders Lorentz had received he ordered on 3 February 1940 LLv 26 to use Mensuvaara as the base for Det Kivinen's Gladiators. Two days later the Gladiators had deployed to Mensuvaara. Det Luukkanen returned to Karelian Isthmus on 4 Feb. On 7 Feb Det Kivinen's Gladiators moved to Värtsilä in order to protect the railway traffic. In his 3 Feb order Lorentz gave individual assignments for the squadrons, areas of responsibility, bases, ground radio station locations, procedures and even training. The goal was to inflict as large losses to the enemy bombers as possible. The attacks were to be carried out "against enemy formations from the most advantageous direction and against the last aircraft in the formation. In pursuit can the border of the area of responsibility be crossed. The enemy fighter formations were to be avoided if they were co-altitude or higher. Close combat was not to be engaged."
Lorentz went on: "Deeper behind the front the enemy fuel state was to be exploited by attacking returning aircraft on their way to home bases. Air Tasking Order fragments were to be received a day prior to the mission over enemy territory or close to the front in order to guarantee a proper mission preparation (Lorentz changed this order on 8 Feb by ordering LLv 24 to keep one four-ship on alert and giving major Magnusson the authority to order the mission himself for the alert unit). In clear weather the fighters were to be at 5000 meters (17.000 ft) and the time over enemy territory was restricted to 10 - 15 minutes."
To the north of Lake Ladoga Lorentz had new aircraft and inexperienced pilots. Therefore he forbid the units from performing close escort duties and to avoid enemy I-16 and I-17 fighters if they were co-altitude or higher. Lorentz also ordered the units not to commence operations over IV Army Corps and Group Talvela areas simultaneously and to avoid low flying over roads and enemy territory. The orders were very specific. The annex gave a description of how to do the training for the missions: "The focus is on the two- and four-ship simultaneous attack against enemy bomber formations, quick aiming and shooting from a range less than 150 m (500 ft) straight from behind or behind low, routine radio operations, employment of the fighter's performance and proper landing techniques." The whole order was only one page long, but had all the important issues listed in it. In this order Lorentz was also experimenting with areas of responsibility for different fighter units.
LLv 26 was in transition during February; the Gladiators were dispersed at Mensuvaara, Värtsilä, Kuluntalahti and the rear of the Karelian Isthmus. From mid-February the squadron started to transfer Gladiators to LentoR 1 and from the beginning of March 1940 the squadron only had Fiat G.50s. LLv 28 was being formed at Säkylä using the frozen Pyhäjärvi as their base. The squadron received their first Morane MS.406 fighters on 4 February and already on 10 Feb the squadron had eight Moranes. The squadron scored its first victory on 17 Feb. A six-plane detachment flew to Turku on 25 Feb to relieve the LLv 24 Fokkers to the Karelian Isthmus.
LLv 28 Morane fighters revving up their engines in early 1940. Lorentz thought that the Moranes should have been given to LLv 24 to support the effort over the Karelian Isthmus and the Fokkers should have been transferred to LLv 28. The three 7,5 mm machine guns in the Moranes were a disappointment, but the fighter was faster than enemy fighters and more agile than the Fokker.
Detachment Kivinen's and Siiriäinen's Gladiators deployed on 21 Feb to Ruokolahti, where they were subordinated to Det Luukkanen, which now had ten Fokkers and eleven Gladiators. Lt Gen Lundqvist ordered on 24 Feb Le.R 2 to transfer all Gladiators to Le.R 1 (LLv 12 and 14). LLv 24 moved to Immola on 25 Feb 1940. On the next day the enemy bombed the base with heavy formations. This resulted in substantial damage in the base and the loss of one fighter. LLv 24 had to move to Lemi in early March and on 10 March to Ristiina.
Lorentz writes the dispersed ops CONOPS
Lorentz gave new orders on 27 Feb concerning the aircraft deployments and the arrangements in the new squadrons. LLv 24 orders read: "The higher enemy activity and larger number of formations means that all reported and reachable formations can not be intercepted with large enough formations to prevent the enemy from performing its mission. This kind of activity puts a high stress on the personnel. I urge the squadron to perform its mission with concentrated efforts two to three times a day. Based on air surveillance center information a suitable formation has to be selected, preferably one with weak or no fighter escort. The goal is to destroy the whole formation with a concentrated attack. When using a concentrated force the refueling must be done on a remote difficult to notice dispersal base or on special replenishment sites away from the main base, where the fighters will return only after being fully combat ready again:" This way Lorentz summed up the early Finnish dispersed ops concept of operations (CONOPS). Lorentz also ordered the parts of LLv 24 at Joutseno to fly to Immola and Det Ahola back from Turku to join the rest of the squadron. After that the squadron was to send a six-fighter Det to Värtsilä.
On the following day, 28 Feb 1940, Lorentz wrote the CONOPS for LLv 26: "Because the enemy uses strong fighter forces in the LLv 26 area of responsibility covering the lower flying bombers with several layers of higher flying fighters our attacks against the bombers are useless and result in own losses. I urge the squadron to use the following CONOPS":
1. The attack must done with as concentrated forces as possible
2. The enemy top cover must be attacked from the rear sector and above because the enemy fighters are focusing on the low flying bomber formations that they follow. The attack must be postponed until own altitude is higher than the highest enemy top cover (usually the last unit). Sometimes a lonely "Red Baron" has been observed as the highest fighter.
3. The attacks performed so that the altitude advantage is regained. Engagement in close combat is to be avoided.
4. The aim is to inflict as high losses to the escort fighters as possible. When the attack forces the escort fighters to abort their mission, can the attack pressed on against the bombers.
This was the Finnish swarming CONOPS: dispersed fighters converge and attack in large formations and then disperse again as small units to fields and frozen lakebeds. These pulsing attacks went on throughout the war.
Lorentz had visited Lt Gen Lundqvist a week earlier and he had explained the tactics of using a six-ship (three two-ships) as the basic formation in LLv 26. The attack was to be commenced from high above with over speed. First four fighters would force the escort fighters into combat and the last two-ship would press on straight against the bombers, shoot their bursts and dive low. The tactic called for Fiats, but there were only few combat ready Fiats in LLv 26. The previous LLv 26 tactics concentrated in escort fighters, but by destroying them you didn't gain much in the defence of the city of Kouvola. But obviously LLv 26 didn't have strength to do much else in the current circumstances.
The Soviet Air Force attacked Immola base on 29 Feb with 40 fighters. The Finns tried to avoid fighter-to-fighter combats, but due to inaccuracies in the air surveillance messages the Finns scrambled LLv 24 Fokkers and LLv 26 Gladiators against the enemy and to their great surprise found themselves outnumbered in the largest air combat during the Winter War. The Finns lost seven fighters with four pilots lost and three wounded. The enemy lost only four aircraft in the 15-minute long air combat. This was the worst loss for the Finns during the war and resulted from the poor initial setup. The fight proved once again the dangers in the fighter-to-fighter combat and the right decision to restrain fighter operations in spite all requests and demands. The combat also proved that the Gladiators and the Fokkers weren't a match for the enemy fighters. The Gladiator was agile, but slow.
Flight Regiment 2 fighter situation on 1 March 1940 was:
LLv 22: 4 Brewsters at Hollola
LLv 24: 10 Fokkers at Joutseno (14 under repair)
LLv 26: 10 Fokkers and 1 Gladiator at Utti (3 Gladiators and 11 Fokkers under repair)
LLv 28: 21 Moranes at Säkylä (4 under repair)
From mid-February a new fighter squadron, LLv 22, was being formed. Capt Erkki Heinilä was leading the preparations since he was available after transferring the Bulldogs to training purposes. A new runway was cleared on the ice of Lake Vesijärvi just north of Lahti. On 5 March the squadron got the first three Brewster fighters (that "Joppe" Karhunen had been test flying in Trollhättan, Sweden). At the end of Winter War LLv 22 had five Brewsters, but they didn't make it to combat operations.
Finnish Air Force used a lot of frozen lakes as runways during Winter War to enhance the dispersed ops CONOPS. Since there weren't enough tractors in the new fighter squadron to pull the rolls to press the snow horses were used.
Eight Hawker Hurricanes from England (HC) arrived at Säkylä on 8 March 1940, but also they didn't make it to combat operations. On 7 March a detachment of LLv 28 Morane fighters was moved to Hollola from where they operated to the Bay of Viipuri. The Moranes weren't combat ready yet, but because of the desperate situation in the Viipuri area they had to be thrown into combat. Just after the war Finland received six Caudron C.714 fighters from France, but they turned out to be incapable for takeoff from any Finnish runway in combat configuration. After some test flights the fighters were removed from inventory. The fast activation of several fighter squadrons during the Winter War was an almost impossible mission. That the poorly trained new squadrons were even able to score some victories is a testimony to the poor training standard of the Soviet fighter pilots and the chances the Finns had lost during peace before the war.
Because of enemy fighter operations LLv 26 fighters moved from Utti to Hollola and LLv 24 to Lemi. Once again Magnusson's Fokker squadron fought as one. When it became evident that the enemy was planning to bomb Lemi, LLv 24 was transferred to Ristiina on 10 March. There were series of combats in early March and when the situation at Viipuri got worse the Finnish Air Force started using even fighters on very dangerous low-level missions to strafe the enemy formations on the ice of the Bay of Viipuri until the cessation of operations 11.00 o'clock local time on 13 March 1940.
The command and control arrangements at the Karelian Isthmus were under discussion several times during the Winter War. The commander of LentoR 1 (Col Y. Opas) was The Air Component Commander for the Karelian Isthmus Army and had three support squadrons under his direct command. He was following the situation at the Karelian Isthmus Army HQ and knew the army needs and forwarded them to Lt Gen Lundqvist. When LentoR 1 commander needed fighters he had to ask for them from Lt Gen Lundqvist or if the mission was already ordered from Lt Col Lorentz or maybe turn to LLv 24 commander major Magnusson. Col Opas didn't find this very efficient or flexible - and it didn't suit his eager character. Therefore LentoR 1 commander suggested several times that the fighters at Karelian Isthmus should be under his command so that he could use them for frontal duties; escort, hunting artillery spotting aircraft and balloons and even air-to-ground operations. Lt Gen Lundqvist was afraid - as proven by the 29 Feb combat over Immola - that the fighters would be used prematurely and after that the Finnish rear areas would be totally without fighter cover and the ease in the front would only be temporary if the fighters would be used there. Lundqvist knew the big picture and wanted to keep the fighters under the control of a true fighter expert, Lt Col Richard Lorentz.
Lorentz solved the fighter squadron co-operation in LentoR 2 by subordinating LLv 26 Gladiators operating in the Karelian Isthmus rear to LLv 24 commander. This didn't solve the relationship to LentoR 1 commander and his wishes. When LentoR 4 started operations to Karelian Isthmus in the end of February and from the beginning of March also parts of LLv 28 and 22 were taken in, the situation would have needed a reorganization to solve the co-operation issues. There was no time to do this before the war ended on 13 March 1940. So all three flight regiments operated to the Bay of Viipuri as wings or "services", whereby the co-operation between the regiments wasn't as efficient as it should have been.
Wrong procurement plan and wrong timing
The only fighter wing in Finland, Flight Regiment 2, scored 169 victories during the 105 days of the Winter War. The score proved right the visions of Richard Lorentz and Eka Magnusson about the need for strong fighter forces. Tactics against bombers worked well even after the limited training allowed by the fuel quotas before the war. Only the attacks against bomber formations had been thoroughly practiced and there had been no flight hours to train how to command fighter formations. Soviet fighter pilots turned out to bee poorer shooters than anticipated. Their tactic was to fly in a rigid three-plane formation and try to engage in a dogfight. The pilots were skillful and courageous, but lacked preplanned co-ordinated tactics training. All this called for cautious approach to aerial combat as proved by the catastrophe over Ruokolahti on 29 Feb 1940 where the enemy easily shot down seven Gloster Gladiators while they were taking off from Immola base. Because the enemy had better fighters the Finns had to fight with larger than planned formations over the front. Even this had to be abandoned when the Commander of the Air Force split Fighter Squadron 24 into small detachments to support the home front. The Winter War initiated a habit where the Commander of the Air Force would at times micromanage at a short notice the fighter operations bypassing the normal chain of command. There was no single operational command for the Finnish Air Force during the Winter War. The poor lines of communications didn't allow command and control from the General Staff at Mikkeli. FiAF high command should have visited the LLv 24 command post at least once to realize the way to command and control air operations, but they just didn't do that. It took all the way to 1944, when Lt Gen Lundqvist visited the command post of Col Lorentz and admitted that he and his subordinates hadn't understood the issues in a correct way.
FiAF regiments had been "so full of themselves" that there had been no proper exchange of ideas during peace. Information hadn't flowed laterally and unfortunately wouldn't flow even after the war. The regiments didn't want to listen to each other and didn't have the talents to do that. This attitude plagued the Finnish Air Force fighter wings still after the Continuation War.
There were differences between the leadership of the Karelian Isthmus Army and the commander of the fighter regiment. Soviet air superiority stressed the ground troops that were already weary from the endless fighting. Especially enemy gunnery spotting flights threatened the whole defence structure on the front. Army commanders asked daily for fighter missions against artillery spotting aircraft and balloons. The Soviet army tactics were based on total air superiority over the front. Without that the massing of troops and materiel to a narrow area would have been unthinkable. In addition to that air superiority was needed for the air terror over Finnish cities. Judging by the papers from the Red Army HQ all this was important for the prestige of the Soviet state.
The cautious approach by Lorentz and Magnusson in applying fighter force wasn't appreciated everywhere; on the last week of the Winter War during a visit to the FiAF HQ Lorentz was told by a few majors that "Now was the last chance to fix the small loss number and put everything at stake!" Unbelievable reasoning from the higher headquarters, but these kind of talks usually get louder the further you get from the fighter cockpit. The pre-war FiAF development programs prioritized the bombers over fighters, which turned out to be the wrong solution. The Winter War air superiority was lost by the leaders of FiAF during 1935 - 39, probably not against their better knowledge - air superiority was not lost by the pilots over the front. Looking back the funds should have been allocated to some 80 fighters, a robust air surveillance network, radios, a command center, twice the amount of pilots and shelters for the fighters. The week showing of the aviation units during the Winter War was a result of two wrong priorities in the FiAF development program: wrong procurement plan and wrong timing in implementation. The big lesson from the Winter War was that better tactics, air combat skills and fighter performance prevail over a larger number of enemy aircraft.
Latest Topic | Air Warfare | Conferences/Air Shows | Fighter Tactics | Fighter Aircraft | Missiles | Fighter Aviation Topic | Fighter History | Warbirds | Magazines | Current News | Links | Physiology | Photo Gallery | Bibliography | SIIVET - Wings | What's New
J Lindberg. Copyright © 1997-2006 Fighter Tactics Academy. All rights reserved.
Revised: tammikuu 04, 2006.
