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WWII History
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Bengtskär: First Phase

Figure 1: Sketch map of Bengtskär
On the night of the attack, the night of July 25th, Bengtskär was guarded by 37 men, plus at least three lighthouse keepers. Early in the evening a German boat passed by but otherwise everything was quiet. Just before midnight, the two Russian attack squads embarked: one in PK238, Cdr Lt Beljajev, the other in PK312, Cdr 2nd Lt Jefimov. They were armed with light automatic weapons and grenades. They were followed shortly after by PK311, Cdr Lt Bubnov, which carried depth charges, ammunition and other supplies, and the demolition squad. After them came PK239, Cdr 1st Lt Terestsenko, carrying Capt. Polegajev as flotilla commander. The flotilla went due south by Rosaro at around 00:40, then passing over some shallows, headed west so as to approach Bengtskär from the south. The weather was calm and warm, with an air temperature of 18°C, but visibility was poor due to the combined effects of mist patches and smoke from the forest fires. PK238 reached the southern promontory ('Russian Landings' in Figure 1) first, landing immediately below the terrace in front of the accommodation building (See Figure 2. The corresponding view, looking from the terrace towards the landing site is shown in Figure 3.) Note how the wall of the building is still pitted with spang marks – these can be seen more clearly in Figure 4. The balcony, with the door to its left, are later additions. The large oriole window was destroyed in the fighting and has been partially bricked up and replaced by two small windows.
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Figure 2: Looking up to the terrace from the landing area |
Figure 3: Looking down to the landing area from the terrace |
On guard in the lighthouse tower was L/Cpl. Ryhänen. His suspicions had been aroused a few minutes earlier when he thought he saw movement on the waters. However, there had been a previous sequence of false alarms, caused by German patrol boats – and the MO boats bore a passing resemblance to a German Raumboote – which had failed to respond correctly to challenges, and Ryhänen was reluctant to make a fool of himself. Besides, he knew that his exhausted comrades, who had been stringing wire all day, were fast asleep and deserved to remain so. So, in accordance with orders, he challenged the boats by signal lamp. Instead of returning the correct response, the Russian boats simply repeated the sentry's signal. Unfortunately, Ryhänen's command of Morse was not good and he did not himself know the codes well. He tried twice before his suspicions were thoroughly aroused and then descended the tower to alert Luther. It was now about 01:00
Figure 4: The author, pointing to spang marks on the wall of the accommodation block.
Simultaneously, the Russians reached the shore, jumped onto the rocks, and began to spread out in a three-pronged attack. On the left, a group commanded by a Sgt Kibis secured the flank. The centre group, commanded by Kurilov and his Intelligence Officer, 1st Lt M. Belikov, had the lighthouse as their objective. The eastern group, under senior politruk (commissar) A.I. Rumjantsev probably had the Madsen canon and its adjacent AA guns as their objective.
On the southern side of the island, Pvt Nystrand was on patrol. He saw nothing of the advancing Russians until the last moment when he ran to the tower screaming: "Ryssät! Ryssät!" ("Russkies! Russkies!") After which, he hid in the lighthouse cellar where he was later discovered and killed. What happened next is not clear. Someone woke Cpl Harry Bjelke and it seems that he may have responded faster than – or been awoken before – Lt Luther. Some versions have it that it was Laine (the lighthouse-master after whom the room in ** is named) who, having gone outside to relieve himself, saw the attackers and raised the alarm.
Figure 5: The Madsen emplacement as it is today. In 1941, it was simply sandbagged.
Cpl Esko Nurmi, together with privates Virtanen and Kajander, ran to the 20mm Madsen AA gun in its sandbagged emplacement. (See the map in Figure 1 and Figure 5, left, which shows the site today.) Nurmi and Virtanen began firing on the Russian boats but Kajander panicked and hid among the rocks where he was later discovered by the Russians and bayoneted to death. Cpl. Bjelke, with privates Eriksson, Gustafsson, and Åberg, ran out towards the outhouses (See the picture in Figure 6 and the map in Figure 1.) and from there opened fire on the Russians' flank. They continued fire for about 30 minutes until Åberg was killed and they were forced to withdraw back through the north door of the lighthouse. In the withdrawal, Eriksson fought a gallant rearguard action, firing with a light machine-gun from the open lighthouse door at the pursuing Russians before being mortally wounded.
Figure 6: The "outhouses": Sauna, Oil store, and Water tank. The building on the right is a modern addition.
Apparently still dressing, Luther ran to the nearest window from where he called on his men to take up positions in front of the building, receiving a burst of machine-pistol fire in response. From there, he ran to the ground floor of the tower where three men were preparing to set up a light machine-gun on the terrace. Luther and the three men – Cpl Sandberg, Pvt Einar Holmström (the machine-gunner), and Pvt Gerkman – ran out onto the terrace in front of the Russians. Gerkman apparently died after killing a Russian hand-to-hand (and, some accounts say, teeth-to-anything-in-reach). Sandberg died beside Gerkman after receiving an 'exploding bullet' in the stomach.
Figure 7: A door in the "Laine" bedroom on the third floor. From the angle, these bullets must have come through the window of the adjoining room which opens onto the west face of the building.
Holmström went down when his machine-gun jammed. According to the more highly coloured accounts, he fell back into Luther's arms murmuring: "Fullträff, pojkar!" ("Direct hit, lads!") A hand grenade exploded beside them, knocking out three of Luther's front teeth and wounding him in the right arm. Luther, the sole survivor, withdrew into the south door of the tower. Meanwhile, on the landing ground, Rumjantsev's group began taking fire from the flank – almost certainly from Bjelke and his men – and Rumjantsev himself was mortally wounded, along with his medical orderly. In fact, the Russians were not in as strong a position as it seemed. While they had good positions among the rocks and in the dead ground below the terrace wall, they needed to climb the 1.5m high wall (there are steps in the middle) and cross at least 30m of open ground between the terrace steps and the doors at the foot of the lighthouse tower. The Finns, on the second and upper floors of the building had all the advantages of height and a strong defensive position. It was at this point that there occurred one of those inspired actions that seem to happen in many desperate engagements and which decisively affect subsequent events.
The wounded Luther made his way to the designated dressing station, in the radio room on the third floor, where he found Pvt Anjalin – by all accounts, a very tall, powerful man – with one of the kasapanos (satchel charges) which he asked permission to throw into the dead ground below the terrace wall. Permission was immediately granted and Anjalin threw the charge which exploded and killed or wounded about 10 Russians. Amongst those killed or fatally wounded was Kurilov, leader of the central group and in overall charge of the operation. Now Lt Belikov, the I.O., took command. Anjalin was also hit in the head and killed shortly after his heroic action.
Figure 8: The rear of the accommodation block. The bullets which pierced the door in what is now the Laine bedroom (Figure 7) must have been fired from the right and through the 3rd floor window.
According to the records, the duty watch in Örö received an alarm from the Bengtskär radio operator – Cpl O. Ryyppö, another man to distinguish himself in the battle – at 01:06 and radioed a general alert to the surrounding garrisons and to naval patrols at sea and in harbour. For some reason, Sgt Koskelin, in command of the duty watch on Örö, failed to raise Bengtskär by short-wave radio. However, Ryyppö, on Bengtskär, managed to contact the staff headquarters in Hitis (on Rosala island, due north of Bengtskär and west of Hanko) telling them that Russian troops had landed and were as close to the lighthouse as the terrace wall. From Rosala, Maj. Moring ordered the batteries in Örö and Granholm to fire on the waters around Bengtskär, alerted the gunboats in Högsåra, and called for air support. Örö opened fire at 01:26; Granholm at 01:41 In contact with Hitis, Luther directed the fire onto his own positions with nothing more than a marching compass; miraculously, though the fire was devastating for the Russians, the lighthouse received no direct hits. Luther was rightly confident that he and his men were secure within the massive granite walls of the lighthouse and accommodation block which, after all, had withstood the German naval bombardment in 1914. The MO boats which had been circling the island, firing at the lighthouse with their 45mm cannons and AA guns, were forced to withdraw.
At about 02:00, three Finnish patrol boats, with a force of rannikkojääkäri, now came inshore under heavy Russian fire and attempted to land reinforcements. This was not successful and at about 02:30 two of the boats withdrew into the mist while one remained. At about the same time, the two elderly Finnish gunboats, Uusimaa and Hämeenmaa, which were in transit to Örö, were ordered to divert to Bengtskär. Shortly afterwards, at about 03:00, three Russian boats (unidentified but presumably MO craft from Hanko with a similar complement of marines), tried another landing but were repelled and surrounded by Finnish patrol boats coming from the south and west. Shortly afterwards, a fourth MO boat arrived and Cdr M. Polegajev took command of Russian forces at sea.
Finally, a few Russians close to the tower made a desperate attempt to enter and succeeded. One of the defenders attacked Lt Kagalov with a knife but was overpowered, though not before mortally wounding the deputy commissar, Lt Kostritsa. The defenders retreated to the upper floors, leaving much of their ammunition and grenades behind. Lt Kagalov, in comically accented Finnish, called repeatedly upon the defenders to surrender. This subtle psy-warfare had no apparent effect. Surprisingly – or perhaps not, in the light of their lack of leaders – the Russians made only one attempt to rush the lighthouse staircase, which is the only means of access to the tower and the accommodation block. At this point, the Finnish defenders were down to their last grenade; Bjelke asked the wounded Luther for advice. "Throw it!", was the reply. The last grenade was thrown and several Russians were killed or wounded. The Russians made no further attempts to assault the second and higher floors but had they done so, they would probably have succeeded for the Finns now had no more grenades and were running low on ammunition.
1. Actually, more of a sump where a water tank had stood. Russian accounts claim that Nystrand was killed before raising the alarm.
2. Some accounts have Bjelke firing from outhouses to the south of the lighthouse. An examination of the site shows that it was most unlikely that there could have been any such outhouses in that position. Other accounts have outhouses to the west of the lighthouse. This is possible but, had they been there, they would have restricted the field of fire of the Madsen gun. There are also no traces of foundations to the south or west and my own conclusion is that Bjelke and his men were to the east. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Rumjantsev's group was taking fire on the flank – fire which could only have come from the area of the oil and water stores which, unlike the Madsen position, directly overlooks the landing ground. It is also close to the north entrance of the lighthouse through which Bjelke and his men eventually withdrew.
3. Presumably, the south door though there is no direct evidence for this.
4. Some accounts say that many of the Finns ran to the windows on the south side of the building and were cut down by Russian fire but I can find no evidence to support this and the numbers involved in the subsequent battle do not bear this out.
5. None of the accounts distinguish consistently or accurately between heavy and light machine-guns and machine pistols.
6. I have used the (non-British) convention that the first floor is the one at ground level.
7. Bengtskär's call-sign was "Farao 4". Literally "Pharaoh 4" but it is but a short step from "Pharaoh" to "Pharos" (i.e. lighthouse) – yet another instance of badly chosen code name. But maybe the Russian IO's did not have a classical education.
8. This is a difficult word to translate because it has no counterpart in any of the Allied forces. The Swedish equivalent kustjäger best conveys the concept as coastal light-infantry. In the Finnish military structure, these were Army troops with intimate knowledge of the coastal sector they were detailed to defend. In a logical sense, they can be thought of as 'anti-marines'.
9. It would have been nice to be able to offer a photograph showing extensive shrapnel damage to the lower stairwell of the tower. Alas, this has not proved possible. Perhaps a better forensic archaeologist than the author may prove more successful.
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Bengtskär
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