WWII History
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Bengtskär
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WWII History
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Bengtskär: Reinforcement
If the evidence about Morgonland seems fragmentary and confused, that for the Battle of Bengtskär is even more so. Even official documentary records are contradictory. What follows is based principally on Lt Luther's testimony, corroborated by the signals records of the Örö message centre.
In June, 1941, Bengtskär had a garrison of six men, unit unknown, and three or four civilian lighthouse keepers. Following the loss of Morgonland, the best remaining observation post was Bengtskär, with its 52m lighthouse and it was decided that this position should be reinforced. On 20th July, Lt Fred Luther and 26 men of 2nd Rannikkoiskukompania (Coastal Shock Company) were sent to garrison the island. They were armed with old Swedish Mauser rifles, machine-pistols, two heavy machine guns, hand grenades, and kasapanos (Swedish: buntladdningar - literally, a bunch of charges), a form of 'satchel charge' made from sticks of dynamite. These latter were to play a decisive part in the subsequent battle.
The men were apparently unhappy about their Swedish weapons, which were unreliable, and immediately set about stringing barbed wire and building emplacements. They also put a permanent lookout in the tower and had two sentries on patrol at night. On 23rd July, they were reinforced by a 20mm Madsen anti-aircraft cannon commanded by Cpl Nurmi and a three-man crew. Their closest support was Örö, 13km away, which, together with a second battery on Granholm, had pre-arranged fire-plans for the island.
Encouraged by their success at Morgonland, the Russians decided that Bengtskär would be the next to be subdued. At first, they considered a prolonged bombardment by the railway batteries and heavy bombers (from bases in Estonia) but this was expected to be a lengthy process so again a surprise assault from the sea was selected, this time with a demolition party to destroy the installations on Bengtskär – especially the 52m lighthouse. The plan was for a silent assault, abduct the garrison, destroy the lighthouse, and disappear without trace. The Russians were encouraged in the plan by interrogation reports from Ahlblad and his men which suggested that Bengtskär was only lightly guarded – which, at the time, it was. However, in fine weather and daylight – and in July, night on Bengtskär lasts from about 23:00 to 02:30 – the island is almost impossible to approach unseen. Consequently, Russian plans called for a night attack in bad weather. In this respect they were lucky: the nights were quite misty, a condition made worse by smoke from fires which had been sparked by bombardments on shore and in some of the nearby islands.
The task was given to 1st Lt. P. Kurilov and senior politruk (commissar) Rumjantsev who commanded two groups of 30 men of a Border Guard detachment, each of which was transported in an MO boat. A third boat was to carry additional supplies and a demolition squad whose task would be to destroy the lighthouse. The naval component was led by 1st Lt G. Lesjepekov. Overall, seven boats were involved: MO236 to 239 and MO311 to 313.
The Russians made various preparations for the forthcoming assault and, with the benefit of hindsight, it is surprising that these did not alert the Finns that something was brewing; perhaps they did. Firstly, the Russians laid mines around Bengtskär. Secondly, between July 19 and 23rd, they made extensive attacks upon two Finnish gunboats, Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen so that they had to be withdrawn to safety in the inner islands of the Gulf of Bothnia, north-west from Hanko. Lacking any heavy naval forces in Hanko, these two old but, as we shall see, effective vessels were thought by the Russians to present a real threat to the operation. So too, in the event, did two even older vessels Uusimaa and Hämeenmaa which formed Task Force Auvinen, named after the commander of Hämeenmaa. In addition, the Finns had a number of VMV boats – 32t wooden craft, capable of 20kt and with excellent seagoing characteristics, but armed only with 20mm canon. They were not considered a match for the Russians' MO boats.
1. It has proved extremely difficult to establish how many took part on either side as official documents and other published sources vary widely.
2. It is a source of some surprise to most historians that Luther's platoon was dispatched to Bengtskär since the Coastal Shock Companies were attached to their equivalent Brigade. I.e. 1st company to I/4.RPr; 2nd company to II/4.RPr; etc. Thus, technically, a platoon of 3rd company, III/4.RPr should have been sent to Bengtskär, rather than 2nd company.
3. This was not a regular Army unit, which may explain its unusual structure and the large number of commissars.
4. Uusimaa & Hämeenmaa were built in Helsinki in 1917 and originally given the Russian names Golub and Pingyin. They were of 530 t displacement, maximum speed of 15 kt, with two 102 mm deck guns in turrets (guns which had never been fired in anger). Taken by the Germans and re-named Wolf and Bär, they were given back to Finland in 1918 in atrociously bad condition. Modernised in the 1920's, and given two Bofors 40mm and two Madsen 20mm guns, they were Finland's best coastal protection vessels until the mid1930's.
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Bengtskär
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