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Gustaf Erik Magnusson - the father of Finnish fighter tactics
G.E. Magnusson in his Brewster
Gustaf Erik "Eka" Magnusson is considered to be the "father of Finnish fighter tactics" along with Richard Lorentz. They both served as commanders of LeLv 24, Fighter Squadron 24 during the 1930's. With the information from some of the leading aviation powers of the time they developed and optimized the Finnish fighter training system and tactics in a way that would produce 94 Finnish aces during WWII and 129 victories with the Fokker D.XXIs, 477 with the Brewsters and 663 with the Messerschmitts. Exchange ratios were 16:1 with Fokkers, 34:1 with Brewsters and 25:1 with Messerschmitts during the war. Magnusson's own squadron would score 877 victories making it the highest scoring single fighter squadron in history.
Fighter training at Utti air base in the early 1930's
In the early 1930's Lentolaivue 24, LeLv 24 (Fighter Squadron 24) received 15 new Gloster Gamecock aircraft which were considered to be high performance fighters during that time. G.E. Magnusson served as a flight commander in the squadron which was commanded by Maj Richard Lorentz. During exercises they came to the conclusion that a pair of two aircraft was the most effective fighter unit. Great emphasis was also put in live gunnery training.
Theoretical studies proved that the combat methods had to be simple and they had to lead to a proper shooting solution. Only a part of the attacking force could be used for a feint attack and the main force had to be concentrated in effective attack against the enemy force. Otherwise the small fighter force wouldn't be effective enough.
Lorentz and Magnusson also identified the need for air surveillance. If the fighters didn't get information about the enemy formations and their headings there would be no concentrated attacks against them. So the basic ideas were correct and now it was time to learn more from the large aviation countries. G.E. Magnusson started to study French and applied for a tour in the French L'Armée de L'Air. Since the times were hard in the 30's and money was tight in the service he had to pay the whole visit with his own money!
French fighter training at Chateauroux, 1933
Magnusson started his visit with a month of French language studies in the Alliance Francaise institute in order to be able to serve as an active fighter pilot in a French fighter squadron. The French Ministry of Aviation ordered Magnusson to Charteauroux, some 265 km south of Paris, to the famous Georges Guynmer squadron of the 3rd Fighter Regiment. The French regarded that regiment to be their best unit at the time.
The first surprise in the beginning was that the French fighters didn't have any radios. The French were using the new Collimateur O.P.L. gunsight where a light ring was reflected on the glass around the pipper. Magnusson liked the new sight, but since the French were still experiencing some problems with the sights Magnusson suggested that the Finns should stick to the more traditional sights until the problems with the Collimateur sight had been solved. This is exactly what the Finnish Air Force did.
The other novelty was the gun camera. Finns didn't have any of those. The gun camera was a great tool in evaluating gunnery results. You could track the whole burst with the film camera. Magnusson made a special proposal for the Commander of the Finnish Air Force to get the gun cameras into Finnish fighters.
To Magnusson's great surprise he learned that France was at least five years behind the level of fighter aircraft in other major aviation powers. The reasons were said to be the monopoly of old aircraft manufacturers and the huge amount of purchased fighters that had to be flown to the end of their service life prior to activating new production. In 1933 the new aviation minister Pierre Cot gave the young designers a chance to show their new fighter designs and France allotted one billion francs for procuring new fighter aircraft.
Even though the fighters weren't top notch at Chateauroux the commander of the regiment, WWI fighter pilot Lt Col D'Astierde de la Vigerie had succeeded in creating a great fighter spirit among his flight crews. Natural discipline was outstanding. Fighter training was done in the fighter units and there were no special fighter courses. The training was started with basic training followed by section, flight, squadron and fighter group exercises. Training syllabi was produced monthly. This was disseminated into weekly training topics within the squadrons. All the exercises were thoroughly briefed and debriefed with every flight commander keeping a training book where every mission was written down with the performance of the pilot.
The French used a 1,5 m diameter parachute target for gunnery training. The parachutes were thrown out from the cockpit at the end of a tactical mission and the pilots performed diving attacks against the parachutes. In addition to parachute aiming practices every pilot's performance was checked with gun camera missions prior to live firing exercises.
Magnusson wrote to his report:"If we want to get really far with our gunnery capabilities I feel that we have to equip every fighter with a gun camera. I don't care how much it costs even if it is the price of one more fighter. It's better to fight the war with less fighters and personnel that know their job and have confidence based on peacetime training than with larger amount of aircraft and personnel that couldn't get during peace the equipment needed to reach the level required in modern air war."
One observation from the French air exercises was that the "flying fortress" concept of bombers didn't work against co-ordinated fighter attacks. A section (two-ship) or division (four-ship) of fighters could evade the bomber defenses and get into firing position.
Magnusson brought the lessons to Finland in the early 1930's. At Utti he and his squadron commander Richard Lorentz took the best parts of the lessons and adapted them to Finnish environment. When the situation in Europe worsened after mid-30's Magnusson felt that he had to enlarge and update his fighter knowledge with the fighter corps in Germany.
Fokker D.XXI test flights in the Netherlands, 1937
Magnusson was present early on when the Commander of the Finnish Air Force, Lt Gen Lundqvist and CEO of the State Aircraft Factory, Mr. Rissanen discussed the procurement. At that time it was considered that the new fighters were needed against bombers and they were not to be used against enemy fighters. When Magnusson flew the Fokker D.XXI test flights he had to report thoroughly the capabilities against bombers, but he also regarded it extremely important to evaluate the fighter combat capabilities of the Fokker D.XXI.
The first Finnish Fokker D.XXI, FR-76 in Amsterdam during summer 1937. More at Fokker D.XXI to Finland.
Magnusson flew the Fokker to the edge of the envelope especially in high-speed dives. He had noticed that the dive was the only way to disengage from a fight against faster and more agile enemy fighters. During Winter War this observation was part of standard Finnish fighter tactics and it saved the lives of many fighter pilots.
The current tactics at that time called for stern quarter attacks against bombers with fighters equipped with cannons. Shooting could be commenced at long range. Magnusson thought that the cannons were not suitable for Fokker D.XXI because it was designed to shoot moving bombers from close range. The cannons degraded the flight performance and cannon fire was not accurate.
Later Magnusson flew the Heinkel He-112 at Rostock in 1938 and found it to be one of the best fighters in the world at that time. In late 1939 the Americans offered Curtiss fighters to Finland. The Curtiss possessed and exceptionally good climb rate. FR-76 with the developmental E-wing at Schiphol, 1937. Test results with the new wing were poor so the old wing was reinstalled.
Evasive maneuvers could have been ascending with the Curtisses as opposed to having only the diving option with the Fokkers. The reattack could have been commenced a lot faster with the Curtisses compared to Fokkers. During the Fokker procurement process also American Seversky fighters were offered to Finland, but they were thought to be too expensive since you could buy four Fokkers with the price of one Seversky.
Two months in JG 132 "Richthofen", 1938
The situation at LeLv 24 was totally different compared to 1933 when Magnusson went to France. The experiences had been utilize fully in the Finnish fighter training. Especially gunnery training was now top quality. Not a single training flight in the fighter squadrons was done without thorough preplanning. Every mission was also evaluated. Gunnery training was arranged the same way as in France and gun camera films were checked and graded daily. With the new Fokker D.XXI being at Utti air base the spirits were high.
Magnusson traveled to Döberitz to serve in the famous "Richthofen Geschwader" JG 132 from 17 Jan to 12 March 1938. The commander at that time was Col Massow and the assistant commander of the 1st Flying Group Capt Matthes. Magnusson served in the second squadron of the 1st Flying Group under Sr Lt Bode. There were three nine-aircraft squadrons in the flying group. The Germans were reorganizing into 16-aircraft squadrons. Magnusson was thrilled to serve as an active pilot in the Geschwader that honored the traditions of the "Red Baron" with the best fighters in the German Air Force.
To Magnusson's great surprise the Germans were only now moving from three-plane formations to using fighters in pairs (or sections e.g. two-ship formations). The basis for the change was more effective maneuvering. The same change had been realized at Utti years before. Also the French had moved to pairs as the basic element during the end of Magnusson's tour at the Georges Guynmer squadron at Chateauroux.
Richthofen Geschwader was in the midst of converting to the new Messerschmitt Bf109 fighter being the only unit in Germany flying the new aircraft. There was no written manual available for Magnusson since they were secret. But better still - Magnusson flew five hours with the new fighter type.
Agility played no part in the specifications for German fighters because their fighter tactics didn't call for agility. The Germans planned to attack bombers from the stern quadrant above or below and they planned to destroy the bombers with the powerful weapons of their fighters. These light fighter were planned for short range intercepts in local area. The fighters planned for front-line duty were designed to other specifications where great emphasis was put to maneuvering capabilities.
The Germans realized their shortcomings in the tactics and pointed that the vast expansion of the Luftwaffe was one reason to that. New secret tactical manuals were being produced and new tactics and formations were developed for the Messerschmitt Bf109. Magnusson noted that it was interesting to notice that the Germans were coming up with exactly similar tactical formations that the Finnish Air Force had used for years. Magnusson figured that it would take one to two years before the Germans would breach the gap between Luftwaffe and Ilmavoimat (Finnish Air Force). But there was no doubt that they would do it with the hard ongoing effort.
German gunnery training was not as thorough as the training at LeLv 24 at Utti. Target parachutes were not used. Gun camera practices were done only against other aircraft with the same attack profiles as against the target sleeve (or banner). This was practical and enhanced skills for the live firing exercises. The live gunnery shootings were done at Wustrow close to Rostock where a Heinkel tow aircraft with a speed of 420 km/h was used to tow the sleeve. The Germans trained only for stern attacks from above or below. Forward or beam attacks were not practiced. The Finns had come to the same conclusions and practiced only stern quarter diving attacks. The Germans achieved 15 to 20 hits out of 100 rounds whereas the LeLv 24 average was 30 to 40 hits with the top scores of as high as 60. This reinforced Magnusson's view that the Finns really were ahead in gunnery training.
The Germans has two advantages over the Finns in gunnery training; their tow aircraft was faster and they could practice continuously. The Finnish tow plane could only do some 300 km/h whereas the Heinkel tow plane did 420 km/h. Magnusson was concerned that the Finnish pilots would learn bad habit patterns and a wrong timing sequence since the Finnish tow plane was even slower than the current bombers. Also the Germans could practice live gun firing at Wustrow continuously and thereby they could guarantee the constant shooting level of their fighter pilots. Because of budgetary restrictions Finland used a concentrated gunnery training camp practice which was not as good as the continuous German system.
Radio was the main means of communication within the German fighter interception force. Fighters could be controlled at a 180 km radius. The concentrated use of the fighter force was enabled in spite of sectors. Also weather service for the pilots was arranged very effectively.
To Magnusson's great surprise there was no strict Prussian discipline within the German fighter forces. Officers and NCOs had a very good relationship and even visiting fighter generals discussed with young fighter pilots in a way that Magnusson admired. Tactical issues were openly discussed and young pilots brought openly up their ideas WWI veterans without fearing their ranks.
Magnusson also heard the "lessons learned" from the Spanish Civil War aerial combats where the German pilots fought against the Soviet pilots. The Spanish Civil War paved the way for fighter aviation when it was realized that bomber formations still were vulnerable to fighter attacks. The Germans made the right conclusions fast and started to develop their bomber and fighter forces evenly. Air Marshall Kesselring said that "Unified command and concentrated forces are the keys to making the air force powerful. These two things are possible only for an independent air force."
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Revised: tammikuu 01, 2006.
