Air Defence in Northern Europe
Air Defence in Northern EuropeWORLD WAR II
Finland
The Winter War was the first real baptism of fire for the Finnish Air Force. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the famous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1939, which resulted in the German attack on Poland in September of that year. This was followed on 30th November of the same year by the Soviet Union’s attack on Finland.
The scarcity of Finland’s material defence resources now became apparent, and there is no doubt that the FAF was ill prepared for the war from a material standpoint. At the beginning of the war there were only two fighter squadrons, and only one of those had even relatively modern aircraft, 40 Fokker D. XXIs, of which 36 were available to the squadron at the outbreak of war. The other squadron had 15 obsolete Bulldog biplanes, of which 10 could be mobilized.l9 In addition, the two bomber squadrons had 18 Blenheim bombers altogether, and the reconnaissance and liaison units a total of 56 aircraft which would have belonged better in a museum than on a battlefield. The air defence artillery also lacked weaponry, so that only 11 heavy and 7 light batteries could be mobilized. The air defence machine-gun companies should have had 120 light cannons and 120 machine guns, but only 24 cannons, 70 air defence guns and 71 infantry machine guns were available. Only 20 guns were available for protecting the air bases.8
Air surveillance was well organized, but the sparse telephone network caused delays which badly hampered ground control for fighter interception and fire control for the air defence artillery.8
The level of training and motivation of the troops was high, however, and thus the same may be said of their readiness for combat. The FAF had already adopted up-to-date fighter tactics in 1935, while many other combatant countries, including the Soviet Union and Great Britain, for instance, only learned this approach later in the war. There are three basic things that made the Finnish fighter force successful:2l
-The philosophy of loose, broad section and finger four formations which had been adopted in 1935.
-The emphasis on individual accuracy in air-to-air gunnery, which was trained for systematically. The Finnish fighter pilots were taught to shoot at certain parts of the target plane and not just at the plane in general.
-The principle of attack regardless of numbers, which always gives one the advantage of initiative.
A supporting factor was the individual freedom of action allowed inside the formation, the principle of "first see, first shoot", which applied to every pilot. This increased the effectiveness of the entire formation, cutting down delays and making every pilot an efficient shooter in a revolutionary way. Also, the small number of fighters had one benefit; before a new pilot was introduced to aerial combat he was tested in the front line squadron and then protected by the veterans through his first critical battles. As a result, the Fokker D.XXIs (FRs) were able to achieve an exchange ratio (kills in air combat versus losses in air combat) of 16:1 against Soviet combat aircraft. This was spectacular considering that the Fokkers had fixed undercarriages, making them slow for bomber interception missions and clumsy against fighters in aerial combat.
The bombers were used to cut the enemy’s logistic communication lines and in long range photo reconnaissance missions. Due to the small number of planes, the bombing raids were more disturbing than destructive, but the reconnaissance results were invaluable for intelligence, mapping and artillery targeting.
The obsolete reconnaissance biplanes and dive bombers suffered heavy losses at first, until the change was made to night tactics. They were then able to carry out continuous harassing bomb raids on the enemy logistic centers and transportation lines in addition to their standard reconnaissance missions.
The lack of fighters was quickly realized within the nation at large, and prompt measures were initiated to increase the fighter force. Thus 92 fighters were purchased or received as donations during the Winter War, including Fiat G.50, Gloster Gladiator II and Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 types. The best fighter acquired during the war, a Brewster B-239, came too late to participate in combat missions, and the same applied to the 10 Hawker Hurricane I fighters.l9
In addition to their normal duties the fighter squadrons, together with bombers, played a decisive role in ground attacks on the advancing enemy on the ice of the Bay of Vyborg in the final phase of the war.
The anti-aircraft artillery was divided fairly evenly into home area and front line troops. As with the fighters, accelerated purchases of anti-aircraft guns started immediately, with the result that 9 Bofors 75 mm cannons from Sweden, 12 Breda 76 mm cannons from Italy and 24 Vickers cannons from Great Britain were received in the course of the war, together with a great number of smaller caliber cannons and machine guns and the necessary ammunition.8
The majority of the field army anti-aircraft units were located in the rear section of the army on the Karelian Isthmus, an area that was consequently fairly well protected. These units also achieved good results in causing losses to the enemy in the air. Many of the home area units, on the other hand, had only small-caliber guns which were unable to reach the flying altitudes of the enemy bombers.8
In Lapland there was a Swedish flying unit F 19, an antiaircraft company and an anti-aircraft artillery battery operating on voluntary basis,25,8 and these units played an important role in the defence of the region, for even though enemy operations in the north were minor compared with the main offensive, it would have been impossible to leave these areas totally unprotected. Thanks to the Swedish voluntary units, all the Finnish air defence resources could be concentrated on repelling the main Soviet attack.
The Soviet order of battle in the Winter War enjoyed a tenfold superiority in numbers over the Finnish Defence Forces, and this meant that Finland was forced to yield ground in Karelia. On the other hand, the Soviet offensive was brought to a stop and heavy casualties were inflicted on the attacker. Germany was hostile at that stage, however, Sweden was officially strictly neutral and the support plans drawn up by France and Great Britain proved inadequate, so that Finland simply did not have the resources to continue the fight alone. A peace treaty was signed on the evening of 12th March 1940 and came into effect the following day. This included a revision of the national border west of Lake Ladoga.
Finland’s strategic position became increasingly difficult. The Soviet Union continued its diplomatic pressure and Foreign Minister Molotov, on a trip to Germany in November 1940, demanded that the "Finland problem" must be resolved for good. The country’s closest supporters, France and Great Britain, were themselves embroiled in the war and in an ironic twist of fate, the Finns found that the only nearby country with whom they could trade to improve their defence status was the Soviet Union’s former ally, Germany, which was at that time prepared its eastern offensive.
From a political point of view Finland did not want to be involved in an alliance with Nazi Germany, but from a military standpoint cooperation seemed to be the only possible solution. But despite numerous requests by Germany to advance their forces beyond the demarcation line drawn through Eastern Karelia, for an attack on Leningrad, the Finns refused to do this.
When Germany began its eastern offensive against the Soviet Union in June 1941, Finland had already given that country permission to stage units through Lapland, and after Soviet bombers had attacked various targets in Finland on 25th June 1941, the Finns officially entered into military cooperation with Germany, marking the beginning of the Continuation War.
At the beginning of the Continuation War the Soviet forces enjoyed only a two-to-one superiority over the Finns, and this permitted the Finns to advance fairly quickly to establish a defensive line in the area where the network of trenches was eventually to be located. The FAF had about 120 fighters in its flying units at that time, including Brewsters (BW), Fiats (FA), Morane-Saulniers (MS), Curtisses (CU) and some Hurricanes (HC), 21 bombers, mainly Blenheims (BL) plus some war booty planes, and 58 reconnaissance and liaison planes of various types, mainly obsolete.24 During this initial phase of the campaign the FAF achieved air superiority, and the Brewsters in particular excelled themselves, achieving a remarkable exchange ratio of 32:1. They added to the Winter War formation tactics and shooting accuracy a vertical energy-speed maneuver which was very effective against their main adversaries of that time, the I-153 Chaikas and I-16 Ratas, which were more agile but a little slower.
During the trench war period the most important air operations were carried out in the Gulf of Finland. These were partly the outcome of naval operations, and gradually the process evolved into the Battle of the Gulf of Finland, which culminated in Soviet air raids on Kotka and Helsinki. Finnish fighter pilots carried the main defensive burden in this battle, and were quite successful in this. The FAF strategy of concentrating on aerial combat instead of attacks on the well-defended enemy bases proved correct. The numbers of enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground didn’t mean much because the superpower’s own aircraft production plus lend-lease support from Great Britain and the United States meant that there was no shortage of aircraft. The shortage of trained pilots, however, became a problem for the Soviets, as became apparent in the final phase of the Battle of the Gulf of Finland. After the major aerial engagements of May 1944, the People’s Commissar for the Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, had to withdraw a whole regiment from front line duties because of the lack of pilots.22
When the tide of war changed and the German forces began to retreat westwards, Soviet pressure on Finland increased. In spring of 1944 the Soviets decided to take Finland before beginning their advance towards Berlin. They amassed a tenfold superiority in troops and aircraft on the Karelian Isthmus and began their strategic offensive on 9th June 1944. They met with some success initially, forcing the withdrawal of Finnish forces along the Isthmus, but in July 1944 the Finns were able to stabilize the front at the Vuoksi River and further attempts by the Soviet forces to advance beyond this line were repelled. The process seen in the Winter War was repeated.
Despite the Soviet superiority in numbers of aircraft, the FAF was able to concentrate its air forces and continue to achieve good results. The Brewsters, along with the Morane, Fiat and Curtiss fighters, although continuing their operations, became obsolete in terms of performance from 1943 on, and new fighters, Messerschmitt 109 G (MT)s, were received, although once again only in small numbers. When the Soviet offensive began, the units had about 40 Messerschmitts.24 Fortunately, the FAF was able to get 74 more fighters from Germany during the campaign, so that despite the fierce battles, the number of Messerschmitt fighters actually increased during the summer of 1944. The number of bombers in the flying units at the beginning of June 1944 was 66.24
One good example of the ability to achieve local and temporal air superiority was the fact that the FAF bombers and a German support unit known as Kuhlmey were able to continue their effective air raids, which were vital contributions to the war effort, as the bombings could be concentrated on massed troops just before their preplanned attack times. Warnings of impeding troop movements were usually captured by radio intelligence. It is also significant that no bombers in the formations escorted by the Messerschmitts were lost to enemy fighters during this period. The Messerschmitts thus achieved an exchange ratio of 25:1.
The anti-aircraft artillery was in fairly good shape when the Continuation War began as compared with the situation during the Winter War. The army corps and divisions were almost fully equipped, although some units in the rear area organizations still lacked adequate artillery support. The total numbers of guns in the various units were 107 75-76 mm cannons, 314 40 mm cannons, 189 20 mm cannons and 153 7.62-12.7 mm machine guns. The clear emphasis in the disposition of weaponry was on the front line troops.8
In the attack phase leading to the trench war line the antiaircraft artillery units served well to protect the troops, and the only problems were the difficulties in building up a working air surveillance network during the rapid advance. Due to the lack of early warning possibilities, some special light anti-aircraft units were established, and these, being able to move with the infantry, could also protect the spearhead units. During the trench war it was the anti-aircraft artillery in Kotka and Helsinki that was under the heaviest pressure, and a system employing a control center with target acquisition and a controlled barrage firing technique was developed in both cities. Especially in the big Helsinki raids carried out by the Soviets in February 1944, the antiaircraft artillery excelled in turning the main bulk of the bombers away with coordinated barrages backed up by special light effects and misleading ground bonfire patterns. The antiaircraft artillery units on the Isthmus were under very heavy pressure in the final combats during the summer of 1944 and fared extremely well. In addition to the losses caused to the attacker, they attracted a high proportion of the enemy sorties to themselves, lightening the burden on the other troops. Even more anti-aircraft units could and should have been concentrated in the Isthmus region, for as it was, only one quarter of the field army anti-aircraft resources were located there.8
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Revised: tammikuu 01, 2006.
