The Winter War

THE FINNISH FIGHTER TACTICS AND TRAINING BEFORE AND DURING THE WW II

By Heikki Nikunen

THE WINTER WAR 30 November 1939 - 13 March 1940

Tactics

The tactical goal for the limited Finnish fighter force was simply to cause as big losses to the Soviet bombers as possible. The attacks were concentrated on the rear parts of the bomber formations and the first shots were fired at the rear gunners.

Because of the small number of fighters it was recommended to avoid the commitments to the fighter combats. The rear bases were used as the main bases and occasionally divisions and sections were located in the forward bases (8).

When the Soviet air operations intensified the tactical direction was somewhat modified. There were so many enemy bomber formations that it was impossible to intercept everyone of them. The continuous hectic flying by sections also was very exhausting. The new tactical recommendation was to make fewer interceptions but with stronger fighter forces. The goal was to destroy the chosen enemy bomber formations completely (8).

The refueling and rearming was often made in the side bases and so fighters were combat ready when they came to the main bases.

During the first war month the fighters` main mission was to protect the army troops, transportations and logistic centers in the Karelian Isthmus. Also on the northern coast of the Lake Ladoga the army troops were protected and in the addition to that the fighters had some ground attack missions. Sixty enemy aircraft were shot down (8).

During the second war month the main mission of the fighters was to protect the rear logistic centers, traffic intersections and industrial centers. This had to be made on the cost of the protection of the front line troops. A special mission was to protect the attacking own army troops north of Lake Ladoga. There were about 800 intercept sorties and 53 enemy aircraft were shot down (8).

During the third war month the Soviet Air Force concentrated big bomber formations on the front line area and also used large fighter escorts. The Finnish fighters could intercept only part of those because they had to protect the main logistic line to the Karelian Isthmus. In addition to that there were continuous requests for protection from the various cities and towns in the Southern Finland. The need for the fighters was clearly illustrated by the fact that the fighter wing was occasionally flying from nine different air bases which were located from the upper eastern border to the west coast of South-West Finland. The Finnish fighters flew about 2000 intercept sorties and fought about 300 air combats. 71 enemy aircraft were shot down. (8).

The intercept sorties had become increasingly difficult because of the extensive use of the Soviet escort fighters. These also started offensive counter air operations by attacking ten times in February on the Finnish fighter bases. The Finnish fighter pilots flew daily 5 - 6 flight hours (9).

When the last war month started, the situation on the Karelian Isthmus had become so critical that the entire fighter force was concentrated there. The ground attacks became the main mission of the fighters for that period. The Soviet troops tried to make the flank offensive over the sea ice and the fighters played the decisive role in repelling the Soviet attacks. During the ground attacks 23 enemy aircraft were downed (8).

The Finnish fighter force lost during the war 24 aircraft and most numerous in the loss list was the Gloster Gladiator. Only 9 Fokker D.XXIs were lost. (10)

The intercept sorties were started by the alarm signal from the air surveillance network. The optical air surveillance system also transmitted enemy locations to the fighter pilots during the search phase. In the beginning of the war the Soviet bomber formations flew at low altitudes, but then, because of the heavy losses, started to use altitudes of 15 000 - 20 000 feet. In the first phase of the war the Soviet bomber formations flew without the fighter escort, and therefore the Finnish fighters could achieve remarkable results by using sections and sometimes even single fighters.

In the end of January 1940 the Soviet fighters started to use drop tanks and could escort the bombers deep in the rear. Big fighter formations also flew independently in counter air operations and made the Finnish intercept sorties much more difficult. The Finns had to use bigger fighter formations with top cover and even then the time frames available for shooting became much shorter than before.

The ground attacks in the last phase of the war were done with as big fighter formations as possible. During those operations the weather happened to be very favourable for the Finns; there was a low cloudbase over the ground down to the coast and then the weather over the sea ice was quite clear. The attack formations approached at low level and used every time different approach routes (11).

Fokker DXXI with skis

The Fokker D XXI (FR) proved to be slow for the bomber interception; for example the Soviet DB-3 bombers could not be caught after even a long chase. FR also was not very good in the fighter combat because it lacked agility. However, it had a little better climb rate than the Soviet I-16 Rata. It was also a stable shooting platform and had good dive characteristics.

Gloster Gladiator (GL) was agile, but it was slower and had worse climb rate than the enemy fighters I-16 and I-153.

I-153bis captured by Finns

The new fighters which came during the war, Morane M.S. 406 and Fiat G. 50, had much better performance, but joined the battles in a very late phase. Also the Brewster B-239 fighters were purchased during the Winter War, but only a couple of those could reach Finland during the last days of the war. The Finnish top fighter ace, Ilmari Juutilainen, told later that if they had had Brewsters already in the beginning of the Winter War, the Soviets had suffered so heavy losses already in the first phase of the war that they had not been able to continue air operations over Finland.

The Soviet fighter formation tactics was based on the three airplanes` tight vic formation

The Soviet fighter formation tactics was based on the three airplanes` tight vic formation. There was also a goal for the formation to shoot simultaneously with the leader. The aim obviously was to have a wide fire pattern, but in practical fighter combat the method was without any possibilities for a success.

In the beginning of the war the cooperation with the Soviet bombers and fighters was poor. They flew separately and fighters operated mainly over the front line area. There their numbers were so abundant that the obsolete Finnish reconnaissance aircraft had to change over to the night operations.

In February the enemy intensified its air operations and after taking into the use 15 gal plywood drop tanks started to escort the bomber formations with 9 - 27 fighters` groups. At the same time it started the attacks on the Finnish air bases.

The Soviet fighters had armoured pilot seats. The fuel tank was covered with rubber and in the front bottom of that also was an armour plate. The back armour of the pilot`s seat was strong enough for a 7.7 millimeter armour bullet (12).

The Soviet fighters` ground attacks caused many troubles for the Finnish front line troops when the Finnish fighters were tied to the bomber interceptions.

The big numbers of the Soviet agile fighters made the Finnish fighter operations very difficult in the last phase of the war. The better formation tactics and especially the shooting accuracy of the Finnish fighter pilots made it possible to fulfill the main mission and at the same time to strengthen the total fighter force.

Training units

The 2 Training Wing was transferred in the end of October from Utti Air Base to Parola Air Base. It contained two squadrons and the number of the students was about 70. There were only 10 aircraft in the beginning of the war and 20 when the war ended. The type variety was remarkable including Bulldog, Gamecock, Tuisku, Jaktfalken, Gloster Gauntlet, Kotka, Pyry and a war booty I-153 (5).

The Training Wing sent during the war altogether 94 pilots, including 19 foreign volunteers, to the front line squadrons. The training squadrons flew 1070 flight hours (5).

The most important training subjects were (8):

section and division attacks on the enemy bomber formations

the quick aiming and shooting at the ranges less than 150 yards from behind and from behind and below

good radio traffic

the instinctive handling of the fighter

good landing technique

The typical exercises were:

air gunnery at the target cylinder; approach from ahead and above, split-s and shooting at the short range. If the air target was not available the shooting was made at the ground target, but the fire was opened immediately after a tight turn

aiming exercises with similar techniques; two fighters were alternating as an attacker and as a target

radio exercises combined with formation and search flights

aerobatics and tight turns during which the pilot had to look out to the rear sector

landing exercises

Landing exercises as special issues tell about the rough conditions in the temporary air bases which often were hastily made on the ice of the lakes.

Air Academy

When the Winter War started the cadet course was in the final phase of its program. The 17 cadets were promoted to second lieutenants and sent to the front-line squadrons. The reserve pilot courses, with altogether 107 students, continued according to their program and a new war pilot course with 84 students was started in December 1939. The second war pilot course, also with 84 students, started in February 1940.

The elementary flight training included fighter tactics, and war experiences were delivered to the students via a little summary booklet. The flight program included air combat maneuvers, pursuit exercises, section training and "shooting" with gun camera. Typical for the motivation of the students was that for example the dive phases in the aerobatics were used at the same time as the ground attack aiming exercises! (13)

The handling of the aircraft was emphasized and instrument flying program included recoveries from uncontrolled conditions like spins, and aerobatics included inverted maneuvers like spins and turns (14).

The volume of the Winter War flight training was planned according to the pilot loss estimates made before the war. In reality the training volume exceeded the need because the pilot losses proved to be much less than those which were estimated. Therefore the front line squadrons needed only few new pilots and too many students gathered in the training squadrons. This also affected the course schedules in the Air Academy. Those had to be lengthened because the training squadrons could not take more students into their flight programs.

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Revised: tammikuu 01, 2006.