Russian Air Force 3.5

3.5. Operation Principles

The operation principles of Soviet Air Force were characterized by strict subordination to the decisions of the combat command, and guidance and control over the smallest of details in every mission. Similar operation principles are still widely followed. Even though the need for reforms has been brought up by several sectors, in a large organization it takes time before they are carried out.

The role of combat command has included besides the normal giving of target data and direction and altitude directions, also making tactical and emergency decisions and giving orders related to, for example, use of the afterburner. Free-form air combat exercises have remained an exception to the rule. The tactics applied by MiG-29s has differed only slightly from MiG-23 tactics. Interception exercises against targets flying below 600 meters have been rare. The dominant role of combat command has continued also with the MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft generation (19).

The command center of the fighter regiment plays a central role in having the exercise flight program completed. Usually it is a command post, which resembles air traffic control tower, with an excellent view over the ramp as well as the taxiway and runway. The command post crew consists of flying operations commander, who is usually a senior pilot with at least major's rank, radar controller and regiment level controller. The command center makes most of the decisions that in the West are made in the aircraft's cockpit (19).

Attention has been paid to the negative consequences of these operation principles. Because of them the pilots lack tactical imagination and initiative, are unable to make decisions in changed or unexpected situations and they are unwilling to take responsibility. The air force command has interfered in the habit to simplify the exercises so that the performance figures become more impressive (19).

The regiment's annual training plan provides the basis for daily sorties and distribution of missions. Naturally the plan undergoes many changes in practice because of weather conditions and different additional exercises and meets. Earlier, when Russian pilots flew almost as much as international norms require, most of the flying hours were given to young pilots so that the training objectives could be attained sooner. Now that the flying hours have dropped to as low as 10 - 20 a year, which is about 13 percent of the required level, the flying hours are reserved for the more experienced pilots. This way the air force units try to maintain their readiness at least in the most important mission categories. In 1995 the Frontal Aviation fulfilled 28 percent, the Long-Range Aviation 43 percent and the Transport Aviation 63 percent of their minimum flying hour norms. The units could carry out 30 - 40 percent of the training flights and 5 - 10 percent of regular staff combat training. For many pilots, who have fallen from their previous pilot rating category, this means an arduous attempt to regain the previous readiness level by proving their skills once more (20,26). In the Air Defense Force the situation with the MiG-31 aircraft became so serious that the CIC threatened to ground the aircraft - described as demanding and complex - after several accidents, unless the flying hours can be returned to the level aviation safety requires. The naval air force units are experiencing similar flying hour problems (20).

The regiments usually have six-day working weeks in two shifts, and the squadrons alternate flying days with maintenance and sortie preparation days. In one shift, the flying days are Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday, and the maintenance and sortie preparation days are then Monday, Wednesday and Friday. Squadron commander, his deputy and the flight commanders get together on Mondays at 09.00 hours to go through the previous week's events and to plan the flight program for the coming week. Usually the deputy commander has prepared the draft plan on Sunday. In other words, he as well as many regiment level controllers has the honor to work 7-day weeks. The squadron operations officer prepares the next day's program. He appoints the pilots and defines the necessary flight control, navigation and exercise area services (19).

Tactical controllers go through the flight program and decide who will be needed at the command post during the flying operations. They decide the take-off and landing times and airspace division. They have exact lists about the planned maneuvers, speed limits, fuel consumption at different altitudes and sortie profiles, emergency airfields, aviation reports, etc. (19)

Between 10.00 and 11.00 hours the pilots and flight commanders go through the flight registration tapes from the previous week. At 11.00 - 11.30 the squadron commander announces what are the focus areas of the sorties and his deputy gives each pilot his task for the next day from the combat training course handbook. Between 11.30 and 13.00 hours the pilots prepare detailed sketches about how they intend to carry out their task. In case the sortie is considered demanding, the squadron commander or his deputy checks the plan. After this the pilots make fuel consumption calculations for their sortie and the tactical controller verifies them for approval. The lunch hour is at 13.00 - 15.00 hours after which the sortie planning continues. At 16.00 hours the pilots go through the cockpit procedures and at 16.30 - 17.00 they walk through their forthcoming flight path simulating it from take-off to landing (19).

On the flying day the squadron commander and flight commanders meet at 05.40 to go through the program for the day. The aircraft are towed from the hangars onto the ramp. After this the regiment weather surveillance makes a 15 - 20-minute flight to survey the prevailing conditions. The pilots arrive to the squadron from their quarters between 06.00 and 07.00 hours by bus and eat breakfast at the officers' canteen. Afterwards, 07.30 - 08.00, there is a common briefing in which the regiment commander gives his instructions about flight safety and how to fulfill the tasks. After this the meteorologist gives his report and the tactical controller explains the objectives of the exercise flights. Then comes combat command briefing and repetition of safety regulations and exercise limits (19).

After the briefings, each pilots goes through a medical examination, where his blood pressure, temperature, pulse, perspiration and general condition are measured and assessed. Generally this is considered to be a check aimed at eliminating those who have used alcohol from that day's flying service. After the medical, the pilots on the day's first flying shift go through the cockpit and emergency measures again. Then they pick up their equipment and walk to the planes to wait till the start at 09.00 hours. The squadron detachments usually use regular section partners (19).

The first flying shift usually lands at 09.40 hours. At that time the second shift eats its breakfast and goes through their tasks with the squadron commander and the combat command. The second shift takes off at 10.20 and the third shift at 11.40. The first flying period ends at 13.00 at a common briefing lead by the regiment training officer. Then begin the preliminary preparations for the next day's sortie planning. After that begins the second flying period which ends at 19.00 (19).

The regiment normally had 24 aircraft in the daily flight program. Single-seaters usually made 5-6 flights a day and the double-seaters a few more. The regiment could make 180 short flights during the training day. Each squadron usually had one spare aircraft for every three planes participating in the sorties. Growing attention has been paid to saving fuel, but still the intensity of flying operations has fallen to a fraction of what it used to be. The continuous "orthographic" handling of minute details has been a target of considerable criticism. It is said to kill all own initiative and independent thinking (19).

In their flying operations the regiments use tactical calls and the radio frequencies used are all preprogrammed local or route channels. The pilots use personal three-number call signs. Radio traffic is kept to the minimum. For instance, when taking off, the leader signals the wing planes to increase thrust by turning the stabilizer to "up" position. In section take-offs the lateral separation is 15 meters and the distance separation 25 meters. The runways are made of concrete slabs and inequality of the surface as well as foreign objects on the runway cause lots of problems (19).

The Russian Air Force has not paid much attention to use of simulators, and thus there are very few simulators facilitating full scope of missions. Simulators with all-around visual displays and weapon system integration are probably placed in such weapon system and tactics centers as Vladimirovka and Lipetsk. The simulators in other places are mainly analog cockpit simulators supplemented with camera/scale terrain visuals (19).

The simulators are seriously underused, since they fail to imitate actual aircraft accurately. Experienced pilots have criticized that, firstly, the simulators were not very helpful in training and, secondly, because of their shortcomings they even had negative effects on training (19).

Training and firing areas are usually pretty close to airbases, and thus transfers do not take much flying time. Instead of automatic score indicators, Russia usually relies on the observations of a target chief. In addition to daily exercises on local ranges, the air force regiments used to participate in joint exercises and firing practice. Fighter squadrons used to have one or two joint tactical exercises at regiment level and five to six tactical exercises at squadron level each year. In the early years of the 1980s the Soviet Air Force practiced regularly squadron and regiment detachment attacks against airbase targets both night and day. The exercise program could include search missions, air-to-air combat, assaults, fighter escorting and protection, and the primary training task were low level attacks against an airbase under electronic countermeasures conditions (19).

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union the most important air combat center was the Mary training area in the Kara Kum desert in Turkmenistan, near the Caspian Sea. Air force units used to come there regularly to joint exercises and firings. There were two airbases in the area: the Mary 2 was the fighter airbase of the Soviet Air Defence Force and the Mary 1 had depots and ordnance for several different types of aircraft (19).

When the exercise began, the whole air force regiment - the pilots, maintenance, officials, canteen personnel, drivers, even the waiters of the officers' canteen - were moved to the Mary. The objective was to simulate pre-war transfer of forces to advanced Warsaw Pact positions. The exercise began with a briefing to all regiment pilots and evaluation center staff. During the exercise each unit could expect to get an order, without a preliminary warning, to fulfil one of its most important wartime tasks. The satisfactory evaluations in the regiment readiness inspection in the Mary were 5/5 (excellent) and 4/5 (good) (19).

By the end of the two-week exercise, each squadron flew as part of a full regiment against an equally sized target detachment. Still, the experiences gained during the exercise did not have any effect on post-exercise training in the home base. Besides, during the exercise in the Mary the participating units had hardly any contacts between them (19).

As the amounts of exercises started to drop already during the final Soviet years, the air force command tried to renew the exercise procedure so that the emphasis would have been shifted from inspections primarily to development and training. There used to be 80 training areas, but when the Eastern Europe was not any more available, about a third of the training grounds were taken from use. Most of the training areas facilitating actual firing, like Polesski in Belarus and Mary in Turkmenistan, were lost to newly independent countries. At the moment the Russian Air Force has at its disposal 36 training areas, 20 of which serve solely the limited attack operations of the VVAUL training (19).

The Gulf War had some clearly visible influences on training practices of the Russian Air Force. The Air Force used large formations, flight refueling, precision weapons and airborne command post in its exercises (6). One such exercise was the Voshod-93 on May 18 - 19, 1993. The exercise was commanded by the CIC of the Air Force himself, and the objective was "to simulate problems related to transfers of personnel, equipment and weaponry between theaters of war, and interoperation of different air force units during operations". The movable detachment consisted of six Tu-95 bombers, ten Su-24 attack aircraft and four Su-27 escort fighters. These were supported by twelve Il-78 flight refueling tankers, one A-50 AWACS and two airborne command posts for the CIC of the Air Force and his command group (19).

The air force detachments took off from three airfields in west Russia on May 18 at 01.00 hours local time and headed for the Far East. The Su-24s refueled twice during the flight lasting 12.5 hours and the Su-27s landed for refueling. The actual tasks were carried out in the training area in Amur, while the CIC commanded the operations from his command post built in an Il-62. The chief of air force staff coordinated the ground operations from the Air Force Operations Center in Moscow. The distance traveled was 8,000 km and full readiness was achieved straight after the transfer. In the training area the Su-24 attack aircraft made attacks against simulated targets. The two-day exercise came to an end when the aircraft returned to their bases on May 19 at 17.00 hours local time (19). With the exercise Russia probably wanted to show that it is capable of meeting the doctrine requirements concerning rapid use of force on different national borders, to display the current standard of Russian military technology and, through expanding the scope of exercises, to recognize where further development is needed (19).

Now the air refuel training has been included in the manuals of Su-30 and MiG-31 in the Pilots Combat Training Center. (84)

In the beginning of October 1997 Russia organized "Redut-97" exercise related to strategic use of force. It was also an obvious attempt to raise the morale within the Russian armed forces. The new Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev was in command.

On the training agenda there was for instance gaining air supremacy and firing cruise missiles from Tu-22M, Tu-95 and Tu-160 from Russian airspace to a rented training area in Kazakhstan (57,61).

The western observers noticed in the spring of 1998 Long-Range Aviation excercises, which were held April 20 - 27 in Central Asia as a part of nationwide spring military training cycle. The large scale excercise involved most of the Russian Air Force`s long-range bombers, including Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, which both carry long-range nuclear cruise missiles. The observers also noticed that the bombers carried out simulated nuclear bombing raids against the United States. (70)

In the beginning of September 1998 the 37. Air Army, which is the new air force organization`s long-range aviation component in the nuclear threat forces, had an excercise with cruise missile firings.

Two Tu-95 MS bombers took off from Engels air base in Saratov and took heading to north. After 2500 km flight the planes came to the launch area and fired H-55 SM missile at a target in Russian Navy`s Kanin Nos firing range.

The shortage of money was the reason to use the Navy firing range instead of the normal practise to use the rented Kazakhstan area. Now the Navy could be paid by giving fuel and the opportunity to join the excercise.

During the excercise the KTS-15 system was tested for the first time; the new system makes it possible to follow the cruise misile`s flight without escort airplanes. In connection with the excercise also a new cruise missile H-101 of Raduga was mentioned as a possible new weapon for the long-range bombers. It would have a range of 5000 km and either conventional or nuclear warhead. (71)

The importance of the strategic air operations became clear in the first training inspection of the long-range aviation component ( "long arms" or "dolgoruki" ) of the supreme commander`s air army. It was mentioned that almost 90 % of Tu-22M3 planes were mission ready and also missile carriers` Tu-95MS and Tu-160 readiness was good.

The inspection took three days; the bombers flew tactical bombing raids and fired missiles at ground targets, escort planes followed cruise missiles` flight paths and observed missile hits, and Il-78 tankers carried out air refueling missions.

The fighter units simulated escort missions on the route and in the target area. All fighter types intended for air superiority missions were included. The "enemy" used in the addition to the conventional weapons also nuclear weapons.

In the attack phase six regiments took off with a mission to attack some "enemy" airfields. The operative group established for the excercise was commanded by Lieutenant General Mihail Oparin, Commander of the Supreme Commander`s Air Army.

At the determined time the 30 aircraft airborne flew to the target, painted the targets by radar and made a bombing raid with precision munitions.

In the last phase of the excercise the mission was to show the ability to make strategic, operative and tactical missile raids. The main aircraft for these missions is Tu-160 with 12 700 km range and 12 missiles. For instance H-55 and H-22 missiles were used during the excercise.(72)

During 1998 almost 100 inspections and 400 exercises were accomplished in the Air Force. 50 % of the units conducted live ammo shooting exercises. Nevertheless, the combat training curriculums were curtailed due to the scarcity of fuel. On the average, the pilots flew 21 hours, and the average age of the fighter pilots in combat units was 36 years. The poor intensity of flights had its negative effect also on the flight safety. Four total crashes (of which one being quite mysterious: the burnt wreck of Su-27 was found, and also black box, fragments of ejector seat, and remnants of the pilot`s suit, but the body was nowhere to be found...) and ten serious accidents occurred in 1998, and in general, there was one flight accident per 35.500 flight hours. ( 90, 91,92) Upd 14 Jan '99

In some air force regiments there are pilots who have not flown in two to three years. (95) Upd 17 Jan '99

The availability of equipment was 65 - 70 % in 1998. The special mention was given to 37th Air Force Army when it got four of its six Tu-160 bombers airborne. Every regiment has one flying unit with experienced pilots as mission ready. The worst situation in flight hours was among fighter units where the average flight hours per pilot was 10. In attack units the number was 20 and in long-range aviation units 21. Most flight hours were registered in the transport aviation. The aircraft categories were as follows: fighters 37 - 38 %, attack aircraft 26 -28 %, tactical bombers 16 - 17 %, and strategic bombers 10 - 11 %. (103) Upd 10 Feb '99

The most important excercises in 1998 included:

-the command excercises of the 37th Air Force Army with conventional and nuclear scenarios -the Otrazhenie-98 (Reflection) research excercise of the Moscow AF and AAD District -the excercises at Lipetsk training center -a ten hour long research flight of combined formation from Savasleika, and -the Combat Brotherhood-98 excercise of the CIS Joint AAD System with representatives of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. (103) Upd 10 Feb '99

Combined exercises of the Russian Air Force and Airborne Forces were conducted on 15 - 19 March 1999. About 20 transport aircraft, airborne regiment, division of S-300 anti aircraft missile system and some other units, overall 1700 paratroopers and 180 vechicles, participated the exercise. S-300 systems were delivered by air to Ashuluk testing ground (in Astrakhan), were they performed firing practice. Military transport pilots made about 25 flights in An-22, Il-76 and An-12 to drop airborne units and about 20 other items of heavy armamament and combat equipment. The escorting Su-27, MiG-31, Su-24 and Su-25 launched guided air-to-surface missiles and dropped bombs. (123) Upd 27 March '99

In the spring of 1999 there was an exercise "Air Bridge-99 Staff Command - preparation and use of military transport aviation in conditions of an aggravation of the political and military situation and the unleashing of a regional war in the West." Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Colonel General of Aviation Anatoly Kornukov noted that Air Bridge-99 was the first exercise of such a scale since the merging of the Air Force and the Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces. He mentioned that, in general, the organization of cooperation was the weakest link in the exercise. The exercise was seen as a kind of counteraction to the NATO`s Kosovo operation. (127) Upd 30 May '99

Similar show of forces, "with aim to unambiguously warn the US and NATO authorities", was arranged in April 1999 in three Fleets, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific, during which one Su-24MR was lost with the crew of two. (128) Upd 30 May '99

As the part of the strategic command exercise Zapad '99 to repell
"aggression from the western direction" there was in the Moscow Air Force and Anti Aircraft Forces District an exercise in June 1999. The enemy was represented by 17 targets including combat aircraft, transport planes and three helicopters. Those were handled by anti aircraft missile units and seventeen crews of the interceptor aviation regiments (134, 135). Upd 6 Nov '99

In April of 2000 the 37. Air Army had an exercise during which long range aviation delivered strikes on conventional enemy targets in Southern Russia. About at the same time the Engels -based 511th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment was training in Ashuluk with Yaroslavl Anti-Aircraft Missile Institute. Targets were Su-24 Fencers with FAB-100 bombs taking off from Lebyazhie airfield and attacking conventional ground targets. Fencers were escorted by a prototype Su-27IB with Khibiny radio jammer. Also three An-12s and three helicopters supported using Smalta and Pelena radio jammers. These had been tested two weeks earlier in Kapustin Yar training ground, where they prevented Su-27 and S-300 missile hits. Additional participants were two Su-25TMs with on board electronic jammers, and four Tu-22M3 bombing conventional ground targets. Also in April the Savasleika-based Center for Combat Use and Re-Training was used for the training of Nizhny Novgorod Region air crews. One Su-30 and one MiG-31 interceptor had a mission to escort 37. Air Army`s missile and reconnaisance planes over the Black Sea. The interceptors were refueled two times by Il-78 tankers and the Su-30 also launched R-73 air-to-air missiles over the training ground.(154) Upd 28 Dec 2000

Commander of the Russian Air Force Col Cen Anatoly Kornukov informed that two Russian reconnaisance aircraft Su-24MR Fencers had on 17 October 2000 flown over American carrier Kitty Hawk in the Japan Sea taking photos and on 9 November 2000 a similar mission was flown again. In both cases the reconnaisance planes were escorted by two Su-27 fighters. The way how the sorties were reported and the way how the sections operated in the non hostile environment raised some questions about the professionalism of the Russian Air Force. (155) Upd 28 Dec 2000

The leadership of the Air Force has complained the insufficient flight time and the continuously declining resources as the main reasons for the accidents and mishaps. During 1997 - 2000 26 accidents and 500 serious incidents happened causing 147 fatalities. Two Su-25s, with a total of about 8 000 sorties, were lost in 1999; one hit by Strela-missile on 3rd October in Totsoi-Yurt and another due to the loss of control on 13th December near Vede. In the first half of 2001 two Su-25s and one Su-24, MiG-29UB, L-39, Su-27 and An-12 were lost with 9 fatalities.(159) 28 Nov 2001

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Russian Air Force, Chapter 3

3.5. Operation Principles