Russian Air Force 3.6

3.6. Tactical Viewpoints

The Lipetsky Combat Training Center is the tactical development center of the Russian Air Force. Its permanent teachers prepare and keep up the handbook of combat training course. The center also develops tactics for the operative units. Tactical documents prepared in Lipetsky are sent to the Air Force HQ to be confirmed by the combat training directorate. Still, their impact on the training programs used in air force units may remain minimal. The methods of air combat have been formulated in the publication "Tactical means for air combat". It describes the offensive and defensive maneuvers such as the "knot", "fork" and "seashell". The document also explains separately for individual aircraft and larger formations the maneuvers and counter-maneuvers with which to take the most out of the weapon arsenal. They include answering to or voiding the presumed enemy tactics with maneuvers, fire, counter-measures and other methods (19).

Also Lipetsk has experienced the reforms of 1998 when its military personnel has been dramatically cut. The Totsky aviation regiment has been simply disbanded, the Borisolebsk aviation regiment has been transferred to the Armavir Military Aviation School, and only nine of the 12 scientific research departments have survived. There is now one regiment of four squadrons of Su-27, MiG-29, Su-24 and Su-25 aircraft (136). The elite pilots serving in the leader groups of the Lipetsk Center flew only some 35 - 40 hours annually. There were also administrial problems like Lipetsk garrison headed by the regional military commissar and 3 million ruble debt to the local bakery. (96) Upd 6 Nov '99

Air combat tactics has been divided into four categories (19):

Offensive tactics, in which firing positions can be assumed from tactically advantageous positions

Defensive tactics, in which the enemy attack is made void

Defensive-offensive tactics, in which the enemy attack is made void and at the same time the initiative taken from the enemy

Neutral tactics, in which certain maneuver creates a situation in which other own aircraft can launch an offensive

Tactical planning includes four phases (19):

Operative threat evaluation

Mapping the use of force principles of the enemy, and the means to confuse the opponent's plans by means of a surprise

Survey of the area taking into consideration the first operations, locations of air defense targets as well as reconnaissance, control and command systems, and assessment of weather conditions, position of the sun and terrain features

Specification of formations, separation, offensive tactics, weapon arsenal, disturbing fire and fashion of disengagement

Russian aviation articles have criticized the fact that even the introduction of the latest aircraft types has had very little effect on the tactics used. In addition, too many commanders show only occasional interest in tactical questions. Inadequate intercourse between the operative units and the research and training institutions also limits introduction of new tactical ideas in combat training (19).

Each operative air force unit has a tactical officer, who has completed a four-month course in Lipetsky. However, he gets very little support from above, since most of the daily documents pouring into the units handle other than tactical matters. That is why the squadrons often develop their own versions of tactics or even borrow from tactics used in units with different type of aircraft. However, there is no system through which the local applications could be put to more extensive use (19).

Criticism has also been targeted against the practice, in which the mission plan seems comprehensive on paper, but then it is flown "according to the old design without an active opponent. And even when there is an opponent, it is of the same type and all its maneuvers are known in advance to the minutest detail." Tight formations have been used in certain phases of an attack, but also in encounter situations to disguise a pair to one aircraft. The low limit in interception exercises is said to be 600 meter (19).

The Afghanistan war was an important influence in the attitude towards official regulations. The pilots who had participated in the war had learned to accommodate their tactics to the battle field conditions. When they returned home, they ignored the excess baggage of bureaucracy that prevented them from using effective tactics in the training programs. Instead of taking advantage of these experiences in the training units, the Soviet system answered by separating these "rebels" and placing them to different units. Thus they wanted to avoid letting the "bad example" become too strong (19).

The early stages of the Chechnya war in autumn 1994 and spring 1995 were a good reminder of the weaknesses of the Soviet-style use of force both on land and in the air (58). Units from the Transport Aviation, Frontal Aviation, Long-Range Aviation and Air Defense Force participated in the air operations. Majority of the combat aircraft came from attack regiments withdrawn from Eastern Europe to the North Caucasus. Most of the 40,000-strong invasive force and equipment were airlifted to quite overloaded Mozdok airfield in northwestern Chechnya. The A-50 Mainstay AWACS of the Air Defense Force constantly monitored all air traffic on the Chenhnyan border. The Air Defense Force also kept two to six MiG-31s or Su-27s in continuous patrol in order to intercept the enemy's possible replenishment or other support flights. Since Chechnya totally lacked fighter interception capacity, no major fighter concentrations were needed (19).

At first the Russian military command used its air force in the same slow and tentative manner as it employed the ground forces. Su-24s made radar bombings from the altitudes of 4,500 - 6,000 meters both day and night. These proved very inaccurate. In Mid-December Russia launched rocket strikes against the targets in downtown Groznyi with five Su-25s. It was not until December 19 that the Groznyi television tower was felled. The bombings continued with Su-24 and Su-25 units based in Yeisk and Budyonnovsky. By Christmas 80 percent of Chechnya lacked electricity and the fuel reserves had fallen to half (19).

The inaccuracy and ineffectiveness of the early stages of war were a result of the lack of training resources. Majority of the initial phase pilots had flown only about 30 hours in the previous year, and only a few had night flying qualifications or precision weapons training. That is why the air force command was forced to establish a separate "tiger team", which collected together the most experienced weapon system flying instructors and test pilots. They were sent to the war scene, and only after that Russia started to achieve results in the special missions in the combat area (19).

In the end of December four Su-24s attacked with FAB-500 bombs the roads between Staraya Sunzha and Verkat-Yurt, northeast of Groznyi, in order to prevent enemy troops from entering the city. In air raids in the last days of December Russia used electro-optical and laser-guided weapons against Chechnyan command posts. With them the Russians also dropped the bridges over the Argun River, east of Groznyi, to prevent the Chechnyan reserves from reaching the capital. In January seven Su-25s attacked the presidential palace with rockets and BetAB 1500-kilo concrete-piercing bombs. Two of the bombs pierced the whole building all the way to the basement. Five bombs destroyed an underground tunnel and the command bunker under the adjacent building thus putting an end to Chechnyan command possibilities in Groznyi. Also a weapons depot north of Arshty was destroyed with Su-25s (19).

The first airlifts to the northern airport of Groznyi took place on January 18. On January 25 eight Su-25s attacked underground weapons depots of the Chechnyans. These depots, placed in former Soviet ICBM silos, as well as the adjacent underground battalion command post were destroyed, and so were the air conditioning valves, antennas, test station and the nearby ammunition racks with ammunition piled on them (19).

The radio calls used by the air force units were changed every day. The Chechnyans initiated special measures in order to eliminate the about forty air fire controllers acting in the operation area. One example is from near Chechen-Auli. The fire controller had hardly opened the radio link when heavy bombarding of the area began (19).

When the focus shifted away from Groznyi, the air operations continued until cease-fire as special operations against road network and troops spotted in populated areas. Photographic reconnaissance and photo-surveys in order to assess the losses continued almost without a break and the weapons used in attacks were precision weapons like AS-12/14 missiles and KAB 500-kilo laser-guided bombs (19).

During the Afghanistan war the Soviet Air Force didn`t meet any opposition with air combat capability over Afghanistan, but the operations over the Pakistan border were different. Tens of thousands of refugees fled across the Afghan frontier into the Pakistan Northwest Territories. The Russian and Afghan forces attacked across the border to chase down rebel units. Airpower became an increasingly important component of this cross border war. Upd 27 March '99 (update covers all Afghanistan air war information that follows)

Pakistan had excellent surveillance/early-warning radar coverage of the Afghan approaches and valleys. The PAF high command insisted a set of rules-of-engagement which permitted the pilots to engage if the wreckage of the target was to land inside of Pakistan territory. In the early years Shenyang F-6 ("Farmer") and Mirage III/5 fighters took off to turn back intruders. By January 1983, the F-16 A/B started to enter Pakistan service.

In concentrated attacks against rebel villages, the joint Russian-Afghan force employed low-angle dive-bombing Hind gunships using rockets and cluster bombs from 2000 to 5000 feet in altitude around the target attacking in pairs or fours on multiple passes from different directions. Above them orbited a wagon-wheel of MiG-27 or Su-22 Fitters armed with fragmentation bombs or large rockets. Above them was the defensive air cover, which was almost always Russian, flying the latest model MiG-23MF Floggers that were stationed at Bagnum. An electronic An-26 was usually found a few miles back into Afghan territory, behind the attacking formations trying to record the electronic reactions and communications. (The Russians operated the An-26 Curl B, out of Sperenberg Air Base, near Berlin, during the Cold War with the 226th OSAP electronic security squadron that gave them the designation of An-26RTR (electronic intelligence gathering). They also had An-12PP Cup C aircraft and specially equipped Tu-134A3, Il-20/22 Coots, and various helicopters operated by the sister unit, the 390th ORAE. The Curl B differed from the transport version with the addition of several large blade aerials along the top and bottom of the fuselage. As the Warsaw Pact crumbled, one of these Curls, called an An-26RT (radio-relay aircraft) made its way to Minsk-Machulische and eventually to the Belarus Air Force).

It was generally noted that when major strike "packages" were sent into Pakistan territory there was always a high CAP of MiG-23s and the Curl in the rear of the formation which might have been a radio-relay aircraft to keep the low flying attack aircraft and helicopters in constant contact with the C3I.

On 17 May 1986 Squadron Leader Hameed Qadri was scrambled after a flight of Su-22s bombing a refugee camp around Parachinar. He attacked the last pair of Su-22s just coming off target and the first one fell from an AIM-9L to earth 14,5 km inside of Pakistan territory. There was a high-cover formation of MiG-23s but they bugged out just as the F-16s entered the area. The second Su-22 was entering Afghan airspace and Qadri attempted a gun pass at a range beyond 2000 feet after he could not get an AIM-9L tone. He was amazed at how "cool" the Su-22 tailpipes were at dead six o`clock. Also, he noted his 20 mm rounds impacting the fuselage, starting a fire in the engine bay, but the aircraft continued to fly. He was under the impression that at that range the 20 mm rounds were not making the kinds of damage expected. Years later the the propable kill was confirmed (the target had crashed enroute back to its base near Kabul).

On 30 March 1987 Wing Commander Abdul Razzaq was credited with downing an An-26 Curl that might have been on an electronic surveillance mission and either drifted or strayed into Pakistani territory just as the scrambled formation of F-16s arrived and was too slow to escape.

On 16 April 1987 Squadron Leader Badar`s target was a pair of Su-22s which were strafing villages. Badar`s formation scrambled out of Kamara when the first Russian strike formations were detected. He was proceeding towards the area at 11 000 feet and 450 knots heading 240 degrees. GCI advised that the strike formation penetrated Pakistani airspace and was in front of him drifting directly to his twelve o`clock. First range call came at 22 nm after Badar and his wingman arm-up. Badar was looking level with his radar and could not get a radar contact, but his wingman called a contact with two bogies at 23 nm but at 32 000 feet, a bit above them. Badar stabilized his section on an intercept heading of 270 degrees and locked on to the lead target at 21 nm.

This was the cover formation of Russian MiG-23s and upon lock-on they immediately turned towards Kabul. As they crossed back to Afghan airspace, almost due south, Badar was alerted by GCI that another pair of bogies still remained over Pakistan. Badar took a snap-vector back to 260 degrees and was accelerating down through 16 000 feet as he got contact on the targets at 16 nm. As he accelerated past 550 knots he noted that there was either another high cover formation of MiG-23s or the first pair had turned back, but they were too high, and effectively out of the fight. He was heading for the low ones below 10 000 feet and now in burner reacting to the obvious warnings from the high flight. At 6 nm the normally cool Su-22 gave a loud growl. Amazingly the Su-22s were climbing and Badar continued to get a clearer shot. Obviously the Su-22s were trying to join their cover formation which was doing nothing. At 3.5 nm, passing 21 500 feet, heading 280 degrees, Badar took his first shot with an AIM-9L. At 2.9 nm, passing 23 000 feet, Badar shot another missile AIM-9P. The first missile hit and the Su-22 started a spiralling left spin downward. The second Su-22 got away while the first went down to impact.

On 4 August 1988 Squadron Leader Athar Bokhari`s flight was scrambled off the Kamara hot-pad and vectored to the area around Miranshah. GCI called four targets which however returned to Afghanistan. The flight continued along the border, and another four aircraft were located at 23 nm but still in Afghanistan. They were heading for Pakistan territory so Bokhari vectored 300 degrees to cut off the intruders. At 18 nm he got a radar lock-on on the leader of the first pair and noticed that the second pair was four to six miles in trail. He chose to engage the first pair, and at 7 nm range with a head-on good tone, the target, now seen to be a Su-25 Frogfoot, just turned to the right in front of Bokhari. At 5 nm he turned to the west and entered a clear six o`clock position on the Su-25, with a good tone. Moving to the heart of the AIM-9L envelope Bokhari finally shot at 2.5 nm closing over 200 knots. The target was at 26 000 feet and just under 300 knots; Bokhari was below him at 21 000 feet at 520 knots. He noticed the AIM-9L impact the Su-25 and both pilot and aircraft fell in Pakistan. On his break back towards the southeast (120 degrees), Bokhari and his wingman noticed flashes and missile tracks. For a moment they thought they were under attack, but it came apparent that it was the rest of Su-25 flight popping flares. The Frogfoot carried a generous supply of very good flares and had they been ejecting them it might have broken his shot because the AIM-9L had not flare ejection capability. The Russians were simply caught by surprise; there was no An-26 up on the horizon.

The Su-25 pilot turned out to be none other than General Alexandrov Rutskoy, then a Colonel and Regimental Commander. Rutskoy insisted that he was downed by either an AIM-7 or AMRAAM from a head-on shot and could not believe that a F-16 could literally "sneak-up" on him. This debrief was very important in that it continued to show the absolute arrogance over the Russian aircrew and aerospace firms that their radar warning gear was so powerful that no US aircraft could sweep them, or lock-up on them, without giving off warning. Indian MiG-29 pilots had had the same opinion during briefings at NATO symposiums and it was also seen time and time again from Central European pilots. In the case of the Su-25, the PAF F-16s were sufficiently below the Su-25s that the warning gear either malfunctioned or gave erroneus indications. Whatever it was, something caused Rutskoy to turn right in front of Bokhari.

On 12 September 1988 Flight Lieutenant Khalid Mahmood and his wingman were scrambled and given an immediate vector northwest towards the border settlement of Nawagai, just inside the frontier from Asadabad. There was a high enemy formation accelerating eastward at 32 000 feet and a border violation was imminent. This would be a cover formation, at lower altitudes they expected to find Su-25s and Hind gunships working the camps. They were heading at 330 degrees and the enemy section also turned north so they were now on parallel courses on either side of the border. Khalid called for a tactical turn back east and slowed to set up a CAP at 10 000 feet. GCI called three more contacts at 33 000 feet, same location heading easterly. Khalid brought his formation around, powered up and started looking on his radar. He sorted an additional four-ship formation stretched out in a wind echelon with around 3000 feet between each aircraft. He locked-up on the trailing aircraft which was now at 16 nm, still higher. He noted that he was heading west, engaged afterburner and accelerated to 550 knots. Passing 20 000 feet in the climb Khalid picked up a RHAW stinger from a lock-up by the High Lark radar of a MiG-23. He called the event and picked up a visual on a MiG-23 at 7 nm, and then the entire formation of four which were in some kind of box that appeared to turn all at the same time. These aircraft were air-to-ground Afghan Flogger MiG-23BN`s.(Only the Russians had specialized air-to-ground Flogger MiG-27s). These were relatively clean without tanks or bombs and painted khaki. The lead two fighter variant MiG-23s reversed course to meet the F-16s head-on. This attempt failed because in their hard turn they decelerated and at that altitude they got real slow fast and the accelerating Falcons continued on after the strike Floggers thus leaving the fighter cover simply out of the fight.

The F-16s closed quickly on the MiG-23BNs, rolled up to get a good tone, and nearly inverted pulling back down through 33 000 feet the leader took a shot at the fourth aircraft which was just 1.3 nm in front of him. By this time the formation of escort Floggers came screaming by and overshot him and the other Floggers. Khalid started thinking about how he was going to shoot down all six aircraft with his four missiles and gun. He was moving towards the number three MiG and launched an AIM-9P. The missile guided and there was no reaction from the pilot. Suddenly a "Break!" call was urgently made from GCI and he disengaged wondering what was the new threat. It turned out to be a late call by GCI trying to interpret the compressed scope picture of the returning two escorting MiG-23s as they chased their own formation home and evidently just passed them and continued. The Army collected both MiG-23 wreckages and confirmed two kills.

On 3 November 1988 Khalid Mahmood was number two in a section loaded with four missiles. A flight of six strike aircraft was up and heading towards the border. Three crossed into Pakistan and three stayed in an orbit on the other side. Heading west with his leader, Khalid locked up on the southernmost target which was thought to be the number two. At 8 nm, numbers two and three turned hard to head for Afghanistan on a bugout. The leader turned towards F-16 formation and closed. It was a Su-22 and still above them at around 17 000 feet. This leader elected to delay his departure until his two wingmen led the way out. Khalid`s leader continued to close and could not make a shot. His Sidewinders could not get a tone. Khalid`s leader passed him the tactical lead and he engaged the passing Su-22 now heading smartly for the Afghan border. He pulled the F-16 around in full afterburner and quickly got a near-head-on shot off at the Su-22 at around 2.7 nm. Khalid`s leader was repositioning for a chase-down gun attack if the missile failed. The AIM-9L struck home, severely damaging the Su-22 but it continued for another 10 miles before coming down, still in Pakistan. As the Su-22 continued on, Khalid fired another Sidewinder at around 150 - 160 degrees off the tail just as the pilot was ejecting. The missile hit the aircraft breaking it in two. (122) Upd 27 March '99

In the second Chechnyan war in 1999 the Russian operations obviously had been affected by the Kosovo campaign. The Air Force was now leading the way with an objective to neutralize the enemy before the land operations. Su-25 attack planes were used up to 12th August when Su-24 front line bombers joined the action. In addition to the KAB-1 and KAB-500L-PR laser-guided bombs the ODAB-1000 aviation bombs were used. In September more than 1500 sorties were flown over Dagestan and Chechnya in two weeks. (137, 138) Upd 6 Nov '99

Colonel General Anatoly Kornukov mentioned that in January 2000 over 5800 missions were flown during the second Chechnyan war. This figure included 500 flights of the military transport aviation. The number of daily missions was 25 - 60. (146, 147) Upd 11 March 2000

According to the news of Vremya also big ODAB-1500 bombs were used against the Chechnya mountain villages. (148) Upd 11 March 2000

Kornukov mentioned that Chechen troops had ZU-23, ZU-2, Strela, Igla and Stinger anti-aircraft weapons. Russians had experienced some losses and over 200 helicopters had needed combat damage repairs. (147, 149) Upd 11 March 2000

In the Voennaya Mysl interview about the Chechen War Col Gen L. Zolotov, the Director of the Academy of Combined Arms of the Armed Forces, said that aviation was the main weapon of firing detruction in Cechnya. It successfully accomplished versatile tasks: reconnaisance, firing, transport and landing tasks. Aviation used many new tactical methods like "free hunt at night" to surprise the enemy. (156) 28 Dec 2000

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Russian Air Force, Chapter 3

3.6. Tactical Viewpoints