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Air Defence in Northern Europe
We started the Air Warfare section with 1997 study for the Finnish National Defence College by Lt Gen Heikki Nikunen, former Commander of the Finnish Air Force.
Air Defence in Northern Europe, Lt Gen Heikki Nikunen
© National Defence College, Helsinki 1997
Lt Gen Nikunen has studied in the USAF Air University and is a member of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences and the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.
AIR POWER BEFORE WORLD WAR II:
WORLD WAR II
AIR POWER AFTER WORLD WAR II
THE CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS
FIGURES (Base map, updated 8 Nov 1998)
All the chapters are on their own pages. We support the study by an image map of Northern Europe with selectable fighter bases showing the web sites and/or fighters types of that base.
AIR DEFENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE
INTRODUCTION
The historical progress of the air power has shown a continuous rising trend. Military applications emerged fairly early in the infancy of aviation, in the form of first trials to establish the superiority of the third dimension over the battle field. Well known examples include the balloon reconnaissance efforts made in France even before the birth of the aircraft, and it was not long before the first generation of flimsy, underpowered aircraft were being tested in a military environment. The Italians used aircraft for reconnaissance missions at Tripoli in 1910-1912, and the Americans made their first attempts at taking air power to sea as early as 1910-1911.
Aviation technology was still taking its first steps in those times, however, and progress was hampered by all kinds of prejudices. Thus, when the First World War broke out, none of the combatant nations had any clear air doctrine or material readiness to assume dominance of the air. But once the initial experiences and results had been acquired , the development which had started gradually then accelerated at an astonishing tempo. Reconnaissance missions were again the natural first area of application for the new branch of the military services, and it proved so successful, and on the other hand so annoying, that some kind of anti-aircraft action was needed. The first weapons, personal pistols issued to the pilots or navigators, were soon replaced by heavier weapons, mainly machine guns mounted over the upper wing or shooting backwards from the rear cockpit of the airplane. The most decisive instrument of the airborne warfare, the fighter, had born.
The problem with the first fighters was to create an effective and accurate way of shooting forwards from behind the propeller. One solution was a pusher engine, but aircraft of this type seemed to suffer in agility and speed. A French Lieutenant by the name of Garros then introduced a straightforward innovation; he mounted metal wedges on the propeller blades and shot through the rotating propeller. The bullets hitting the blades ricocheted aside, and although the propeller lost some of its efficiency, the first breakthrough in air combat had been made. Soon came Anthony Fokker's synchronized machine gun, battles became fierce and the first aces emerged. Along with the development of new aircraft types and weaponry, new applications of air power grew up, and by the end of the First World War practically all the contemporary methods of air warfare were already in use. In addition to fighter and reconnaissance missions, bomber and ground attack operations were being carried out, and even the first interceptions from an aircraft carrier were being made. By the final phase of the war, top speeds had risen to about 200 kilometers per hour, maximum altitudes to about 6000 meters and the engine sizes to between 200 and 400 h.p.
The aviation technology had opened up quite new possibilities for the military applications of flying by the time the Second World War broke out, but again air doctrines were premature and it was only through the experiences of war that commanders learned the right priorities and were able to develop the right kind of material and equipment. Air superiority proved to be of overwhelming importance, and the need for concentrated, flexible air operations became apparent. By the end of the war the speeds of propeller airplanes was about 600 kilometers per hour, they were flying at over 10,000 meters and engine power was in excess of 2000 h.p. Some types of jet aircraft had also become operational, with top speeds of about 900 kilometers per hour, and the basic structure of the contemporary surveillance and control systems was already in existence.
The Cold War, with its accent on nuclear weapons, directed the military aviation technology into a rather narrow planning sector. Strategic nuclear bombers on the offensive side and supersonic interceptors with missile weaponry on the defensive side dominated both operational and technical thinking. High and fast were the key words of the day, and such traditional fighter virtues like agility and cannon power were dropped. But once more the doctrine was far removed from the reality. The various wars and conflicts taking place in the real world fairly soon taught people the lessons which had actually been there to be learned all the time. Air superiority had to be won before any other successful operations could be carried out, and it had to be won with fighters. The fighter pilots had to master combat tactics and maneuvering, and the fighter planes had to be capable of both interception and dogfight.
The Persian Gulf War was the first in which air strategy, training and equipment were on a level with technology and the objectives of the war, 2,3 but this applied only to one side, the coalition. This was why the final result and the pace with which it was achieved was so overwhelming.
From its futile start just over eighty years ago, air power has become the dominant factor in warfare3, and therefore every nation interested in quaranteening its independence and sovereignty, has to take a hard look at its air defences and make sure that its forces are well trained, modern and ready to take up the challenges of an always insecure future. This overview will be concerned with the air defence status of Northern Europe. It examines first the general role of air power, then its historical development, followed by contemporary solutions and future expectations of selected countries. For the reasons of scope it is limited, in alphabetical order, to Finland, Norway, the north-western part of Russia and Sweden. Much of the text is based on author's unofficial files, collected from various public sources.
THE ROLE OF AIR POWER
Like the technical development of aviation itself, the strategic value of the air power has been increasing steadily and continuously. Also, like technology, it has been a target of many suspicions and prejudices. Probably the most widely known case is the court-martial in 1925 of General Mitchell, who forecast the increasing value of air power and arranged a bombing test which was so successful that, ironically, he lost his job and his rank.
Air operations were helpful in the First World War but not decisive. The continuous flow of information acquired by photo and visual reconnaissance flights for the support of intelligence and targeting proved to be invaluable, and air superiority was essential for various operations, but it was not yet a prerequisite for success on land or at sea. The bombing raids were of little military importance, due to the limited payloads, but they had some psychological effect, especially among the civilian populace, and the ground attacks used the latter part of the war lacked any real punch because of the small caliber of the guns and grenade-size bombs. Nevertheless, air operations had proved their value in battle and no intelligent commander could imagine facing a fully equipped enemy without air assets. On the other hand, most of the high-ranking officers still regarded air actions as hobbies for enthusiasts who were bringing some rather disturbing ideas into the military community.
The Second World War led to a vast transformation in terms of both attitudes and results. The major powers had different philosophies regarding warfare in the about the air. Germany and Soviet Union maintained their air forces in tactical roles, while the USA and Great Britain started to widen their scope to include strategic missions. One new feature became common everywhere in the course of the war: that air superiority, or the ability to deny one's opponent air superiority in the critical phases of operations, proved to be necessary in order to carry on any land or sea operation. This was true from the standpoint of both defence and offence.
One of the defence examples that has been spoken and written about most is the Battle of Britain. After the rapid capitulation of the Low Countries and France, Germany was ready to conquer Great Britain, whose land defence was in ruins after the hasty evacuation from Dunkirk. However, there was still one obstacle before the operation Seelöwe could be launched. Air superiority over channel and southern England was deemed necessary for this complicated sea and land effort. Germany regarded this as a fairly easy task after the Luftwaffe's quick victories in Poland, Holland, Belgium and France, but the Royal Air Force had already started its preparations for defence during the French campaign, refusing to commit any more forces to that lost cause and setting about strengthening its fighter defence. One great advantage, the importance of which the Germans underestimated, was the home chain radar network which gave the RAF means of early warning and effective ground control. The number of trained pilots became the critical factor for the Great Britain. The margin was extremely narrow, but it survived the test, and the invasion plan was shelved; for ever, in fact. The fighter pilots had saved the country and Churchill pronounced his famous words: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."1
Famous examples of the offensive actions include the Battle of Midway in the Pacific War and the Normandy invasion and subsequent attack to Germany. Once Japan and Germany were no longer able to deny their opponents air superiority, final defeat was only a question of time.
In the course of the Second World War air power consolidated its status as an equal military branch with the others, and in many countries it was only after that that the air force became independent and its leadership could properly apply the methods called for by the special characteristics of air operations. More importantly, it was only then that the political leadership of many countries realized that air power would be a dominant factor in security policy in the future and was prepared to invest in it to any substantial extent. History since that time has shown that these investments were justified, and the countries concerned have come out on top in most subsequent wars and political conflicts.
The conflicts that have occurred since the Second World War have been very variable in scale and nature, and therefore also in the use made of air power. The Korean War was a small-scale extension of the Second World War in a sense, in which jet fighters dominated the sky and the United Nations' troops typically made heavy use of close supporting fire from the air even in the case of pinpoint targets on the front line. Military success in the various short skirmishes in the Middle-East was also closely connected with the ability to maintain air superiority. The Vietnam War was probably the most seriously misinterpreted campaign in military history. The misuse of military power, and especially of air power in this case, was in many circles, including professional ones, wrongly understood as underlining the unsuitability of the equipment and incompetence of the organizations, which had actually been given a military task without permission to carry it out by sound military methods. Tactically, however, Vietnam opened the eyes of the fighter community throughout the world and caused both training and fighter technology planning to return to the right priorities, which had been somewhat forgotten in the shadow of Cold War.
The extreme ends of the scale of air operations are the guerrilla warfare on the one hand and air strikes on the other. The former leave little room for high technology participation in isolated skirmishes fought out with small arms, whereas air strikes are the ultimate display of air power in which the only active combatant unit on the offensive is the air component. The objective usually is to destroy some limited target or to enact some form of political punishment by eliminating a system or function belonging to one's opponent. Air strikes typically involve a high level of training and a sophisticated level of weapons technology.
The Gulf War was a new turning point in military history. Where air superiority had become a prerequisite for carrying out land and sea operations in the Second World War, the continuing upward trend in development had now reached the point where air superiority was the prerequisite for winning the war. The decisiveness of the air operations from the point of the initiative as a whole and the final result of the campaign was proved with exceptional clarity. It should be remembered that the defeated party possessed formidable forces, including a large army with modern equipment and weaponry. What was lacking was the right philosophy of air warfare and an appreciation of the decisiveness of air power. Without knowing it, the Iraqi leadership was doomed to lose the war before they had even started it.
Many of the countries belonging to the coalition were ones that had witnessed the rise of air power from the early days, and neither the manner of operation nor the outcome was any surprise for their leaders, in fact it was to be anticipated on the basis of the pre-war simulations and exercises. The biggest surprise, in effect, was the low casualty rate among friendly forces.
On the other hand, the the prompt results achieved by air operations were too much for the conservative officer cadre in some countries, and all manner of "nuts and bolts" explanations were developed to play down the overall effectiveness of the air component, mainly related to the environment, the landscape, unsatisfactory probabilities of hitting the designated targets, weather and so on. However, there was no avoiding the truth that if a party to a modern conventional war is not capable of fighting successfully in the air, he no longer has fighting units but only target units. No two wars are alike, and the tempo of operations, loss rates, geographical and weather conditions etc. can vary on wide scale, but that one unavoidable truth will remain.
The high value of air power has tempted many into both false expectations and mismanagement. The contemporary conflict in Bosnia is one example of a situation which is difficult in terms of international crisis management. There are so many parties involved, the causes and motives are complicated, and there are no strategic advantages to encourage a commitment from outside. A certain mishandling of the problem of the Vietnam type was discernible in the United Nations' attitude when threatening the Bosnian Serbs with air strikes if they failed to observe the cease-fire agreement. The goal of the operation was obviously unclear, the target priorities were arguable and the will to carry out effective, destructive raids was lacking. The Serbs interpreted it as representing the familiar pattern of tough talk followed by back-pedaling and inaction. Like a senior staff member at RAND, Dr. Lambeth said: "If you want to send a message, use Western Union."4.
Finally, the more solid NATO commitment brought the use of air power closer to the right principles. The parties in the conflict were given a foretaste of a real determination to use air strikes as military methods for eliminating unyielding elements in the game, by hitting command bunkers, radar and control centers, munitions and ammunition storages and bridges, rather than indefinitely warning the stubborn players. This worked, for the Bosnian Serbs realized through these examples that if NATO was serious and ignored human shields and revenge casualties on the ground, the Serbs would no longer be anything more than sitting targets. This led to conclusion of the most promising peace agreement so far, although the deep wounds already made will still need an indefinite time to heal.44
The mismanagement of the air power is an old military sin, and astonishingly enough, effort in this direction continue to pop up time after time in military circles.
Perhaps the most colorful description about the desire to control the air power is given by Gregory Boyington, who was one of the American voluntary pilots with the "Flying Tigers" in China in 1942. There was his boss Chennault plus General Stilwell and another general, who both outranked his boss but were still without combat troops of their own. Tells Boyington: "The manner in which these three argued over control of this handful of pilots impressed me much the same as three whores would have - arguing over their virginity. The combined stars upon their own shoulders were as numerous as the combat pilots they happened to be arguing about. And apparently we pilots weren't to be consulted".45
The correct concept has been learned by the always reliable try and error method in numerous wars, but peacetime formality often pushes the lessons of the real world into the background.. Air Marshall Tedder's words that " the aircraft doesn't know any other boundaries on land or sea than those which are dictated by its radius of action", give a clue to the right principle. Concentrated control of forces, decentralized and flexible operational systems and coordination with other branches are the key to the correct management model. In the dynamic, three-dimensional conflicts of today, and especially those of the future, all branches are important, and good cooperation between their highly specialized leadership is essential. There are still some officers who are speaking of a "main" branch, implying some permanent priority status. Such statements tell us more about the speaker than about the subject. The role of each branch depends on the situation, and the main role can change many times during a prolonged campaign. The only branch that is able to claim some kind of permanent main role is the air force, for it is the only one capable of purely independent operation. The others will always need air support in any major action.
The strategic value of the control in the air will increase further in the future, and with it the role of air power as a whole, and thus air defence will be crucial crucial to any country's effort to deter violations and avoid crisis in its territory and airspace.
(The other chapters of the book are on their own pages)
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J Lindberg. Copyright © 1997-2006 Fighter Tactics Academy. All rights reserved.
Revised: helmikuu 19, 2006.
