Fighter Tactics History

The Winter War By Robert L. Shaw (An extract from the draft of an untitled book on the history of fighter technology and tactics. Ó Robert L. Shaw) After the Germans occupied most of Poland late in 1939, the Soviets, although under a non-aggression pact with the Germans, became concerned regarding the possibility of an invasion by their unlikely bed-fellows. Of special concern was the existence of a less-than-friendly Finland on their northern border, which might be persuaded to allow such an invasion through their territory. There was also the threat of an amphibious invasion up the Gulf of Finland to Leningrad. Finland had become independent from Russia late in the First World War, with a southern border only about 25 mi from Leningrad (St. Petersburg). The Soviets demanded the Finns concede territory, primarily in the Karelian isthmus adjacent to Leningrad, as well as some strategic islands in the Gulf of Finland and a naval base on the southern Finnish coast, to provide a defensible buffer for the Motherland. These demands amounted to less than 1% of Finland, and in return the Russians offered to exchange about twice this territorial area elsewhere along the border. Largely out of principle and a deep mistrust of the Soviets, the Finns refused. When negotiations broke down, the Soviets invaded on 30 November 1939. The Soviets committed over 900 aircraft and almost a million troops, outnumbering the Finns by some 3-to-1 on the ground and nearly 9-to-1 in the air, and expected an easy victory. The Finnish Air Force (FAF), or Ilmavoimat, possessed fewer than fifty operational fighters, about 18 British Blenheim bombers, and an assortment of some sixty mostly obsolete close-support, reconnaissance and liaison aircraft. Primary among these were Fokker CX and Blackburn Ripon 2-seater biplanes. A stiff Finnish resistance and brutal winter weather, however, quickly halted the advance, with great Soviet losses. Probably because of their over-confidence, the Red Air Force did not initially commit their best aircraft to the Finnish invasion, which was to be known as the Winter War. Their fighter forces were equipped primarily with I-15bis biplanes and I-16 Type 5, 6, and 10 monoplanes, and the bombers were mostly SB-2 and DB-3 types. As these fighter types have been covered in detail earlier, we will concentrate more closely on the Finnish fighters, of which there were just two squadrons. One of these was equipped with about ten serviceable, but quite obsolete British Bulldog IVA biplanes. Bristol Bulldog (Note the blue swastika, which is swedish count Eric von Rosen's lucky sign from 1918 when he donated the first aircraft (Morane Thulin Parasol) for the Finnish Air Force) The second squadron comprised 36 more capable Fokker D.XXI low-wing monoplanes with fixed, streamlined gear and enclosed cockpits. The Finns had bought seven of these fighters from the Dutch in 1937, about a year prior to their operation by the Dutch Air Force, and completed about 35 more under license prior to the Winter War. Of mixed construction, the fuselage had a steel-tube structure covered by metal forward and on top of aft fuselage, the rest being fabric covered. The wing structure was of wood covered by bakelite and plywood, and fitted with hydraulic flaps. The first Finnish Fokkers were powered by Polish-built supercharged Bristol Mercury VII radial engines equipped with a 3-blade metal ground-adjustable props. The Finnish-built Fokkers were fitted with essentially identical locally built Mercury VIII motors. Armament included two synchronized FN Browning 7.9mm machine guns in the cowl, and two more in the wings, aimed with the aid of telescopic sights. The Fokker also offered a much more stable gun platform than their Russian opponents. One of these aircraft was fitted experimentally with a 20mm cannon under each wing in place of the machine guns, but the poor reliability and performance of these weapons prevented their being installed on additional Fokkers. Their heavy recoil also shook the aircraft badly, and the reduced rate of fire and lower accuracy did not suit the Finns' almost radical passion for pin-point gunnery. The FAF had purchased 17 Bulldog IVAs early in 1935, upgraded with the Mercury VI.S2 engine which provided much improved speed and climb performance over the standard RAF Bulldogs. Other modifications included a NACA cowl and enhancements intended to improve arctic operations, like heated guns. As can be seen in Table 20-1, the Finnish Bulldogs were quite competitive with the Russian biplane fighters early in the war, but were hopelessly outclassed in every respect except maneuverability by the enemy monoplanes. Unable to catch the fast Soviet bombers, they were not really a factor in the air conflict, although Bulldog pilots did claim some victories. The Fokkers, however, were quite competitive with the Russian monoplanes in both speed and climb performance, and in armament. These figures might be slightly optimistic, however, because the Fokkers were fitted with skis throughout the Winter War, as were many of the Soviet aircraft. I-16 Types 5/6 were often fitted with non-retractable skis, while the Type 10 and later variants could be equipped with semi-retractable skis. The slightly lower wing loading of the I-16s conferred marginally better turn performance on the Soviet monoplanes, which were also better armored. The Fokker was considerably heavier than the Russian fighters, and therefore had better initial acceleration in a dive. So, even with a top dive speed of only about 320 mph, somewhat below that of the I-16, the Fokkers could usually escape from the Soviet monoplane if necessary. Compared with the Soviet biplane fighter, the Fokker was considerably faster and climbed better, but the I-15bis was much more maneuverable. Soviet I-15bis on skis Of more importance than the rough parity in equipment quality, however, was the relative quality of pilot training and combat leadership. Although the Red Air Force had considerable recent combat experience in both Spain and the Far East, and their top commanders were Spanish War veterans, the Soviets did not initially commit their most experienced units to the Winter War. The Red Air Force command structure was also disastrous. In mid-1937 a so-called "dual-command," or "collegiate control" arrangement was instituted in which political commissars were assigned to each unit with status equal to that of the tactical commanders. Field commanders were obligated to submit their plans and decisions to political councils comprised of these commissars, which had veto powers. The political councils could also recommend demotions, reprimands, etc., which, during this period of Stalin's purges, were tantamount to death sentences. As can be imagined, such a system severely undermined command confidence, innovation, and effectiveness. In 1938 the Red Air Force had been reorganized. The mixed Air Brigades had been abolished and homogeneous Air Regiments of about sixty aircraft each had been established. For bombers this included fast bombers, dive bombers, light bombers, and close-support bombers, normally arranged in five squadrons of 12 aircraft each. Fighter and ground-attack regiments typically comprised four squadrons of 15 aircraft. Seldom were regiments up to full strength, however, with fighter regiments typically having some 48 aircraft and bombers about 36. Four to six Air Regiments were normally combined into Air Divisions. Each military district was assigned fighter and bomber divisions composed of homogeneous units, but the "Army Air Forces" were also retained, with each army provided a composite division. This system inevitably led to fragmentation of control. In spite of recommendations of Spanish veterans to adopt the German 4-aircraft, two-pair tactical unit, the Red Air Force had retained the old 3-plane Zven'ya doctrine. In contrast, the Finns had no combat experience, but were tactically quite innovative and benefited from sending pilots on exchange tours with other air forces, such as Germany and France. As early as 1935, they had adopted the flight of four fighters, operated in two pairs. This is essentially the Fighting Wing, Finger-Four fighter doctrine, the development of which is normally credited to Moelders and the German Condor Legion in Spain several years later, as discussed in a previous chapter. FAF doctrine was quite advanced, and included a "first see, first shoot" policy, by which a wingman was authorized to attack an enemy before his leader if he was in the best position to do so. The Finns were also quite aggressive, with an "attack regardless of numbers" policy, which normally provided them with the initiative in air combat. Such a doctrine, although quite efficient, requires a high degree of training throughout the pilot corps, a fact realized and taken seriously by the Finns. Their training included a heavy emphasis on air-to-air gunnery and strafing; acceptance into a fighter squadron required a pilot to demonstrate an incredible 75% hits in strafe. In addition to the usual air-to-air gunnery training firing against towed targets, the Finns also employed a more unusual technique. They would release a small paper parachute from the cockpit, then maneuver to keep it in sight and make multiple firing runs against it. To aid gunnery accuracy the Finns as policy harmonized their guns to converge at about 150 yds range. With guns widely separated in both the cowl and wings, bullets tend to achieve a very sparse pattern at target range if all are pointed straight ahead, much like a shotgun. By harmonizing all the guns so that their rounds converged to a point, the effect was greatly increased "bullet density" at the chosen range. Inside a distance slightly greater than this convergence range, the concentration of projectiles is much more dense, more akin to rifle fire. Harmonization rewards excellent marksmanship and close-range fire. Because the rounds tend to diverge outside convergence range, however, long-range fire is actually penalized. Those with poor marksmanship skills who expect to take random long-range "Hail-Mary" gun shots, are substantially better off without harmonization. The Soviets, not incidentally, did not harmonize their guns at this time. Fokker D XXI gun alignment on the way Another interesting practice of the Finns was to load the right-hand synchronized cowl machine gun totally with tracers to assits in correcting the bullet stream. The other three guns were typically loaded with incendiary and armor-piercing ammo. Not only were the Soviets still employing an outdated 3-plane fighter tactical doctrine, normally without the benefit of radios, but their overall level of pilot training was quite low, even though there were some experienced pilots available. As an illustration, it was not uncommon for wingmen to follow their leader around during an engagement and fire their guns whenever he did, whether they were pointed in the general vicinity of an enemy aircraft or not. During the Winter War, the Finnish fighters normally dispersed in small numbers to auxiliary camouflaged airfields to avoid detection and attack on the ground. Standing alert for reports of Russian bombers, they often flew 6-8 sorties each day. When not flying, their aircraft were covered and kept warm by the use of electric radiators and heated oil dipsticks, and could be airborne in a matter of minutes. On the first day of the war, the Soviets bombed Helsinki and many other cities, expecting the Finns to surrender. When this did not occur immediately, the Russian bombers switched to transportation facilities, such as railway junctions and harbors. Early in the war the Soviet bombers typically flew at medium altitudes in formations of 3-9, usually without fighter escort, and suffered heavy losses. Russian bomber crews reportedly showed a high degree of air discipline, staying together for mutual protection at all costs. For instance, if one bomber was crippled, the entire flight would slow down so it could remain in formation. The primary Soviet bombers of the Winter War, the Tupolev SB-2, discussed earlier in conjunction with their service in Spain and the Far East, and the larger and slightly slower Ilyushin DB-3, were both relatively fast aircraft with twin radial engines. Speed was their primary defense; they were impervious to the Finnish Bulldog biplanes and even the Fokkers had only a 30-40 mph speed margin. Without an initial altitude advantage, the Fokkers often had a long chase to close with a bomber formation. Once engaged, however, the Russian bombers seriously under-armed, with only two light machine gun covering the rear hemisphere; one of these guns was mounted on top, the other on the belly. Unfortunately, there was only one gunner, so he had to scramble from one gun to the other as the attacking fighters changed position, so it was effectively one puny rifle-caliber gun against the entire firepower of the attacker. The Finns were methodical and relentless in their attacks, often closing well within 100 ft and concentrating on the gunner first, then the engines and fuel tanks. Still, the Soviet bombers were well armored against light machine gun fire, and each attack often consumed considerable time and ammunition. Gloster Gladiator flown by the Swedish volunteers The Finnish fighters initially concentrated on protecting their troops enroute to the front, then shifted to air defense. After the first two days of the conflict, terrible winter weather closed in, effectively ending flight operations for about two weeks. During December the Finns frantically appealed to the world for help; fighter aircraft were purchased from every available source. The first to begin arriving even before the end of the year were Italian Fiat G.50 monoplanes from an order of 25 placed late in October, although these did not begin to be available in useful numbers until mid-February. An order of thirty Gloster Gladiator Mk II biplanes began arriving in mid-January and were immediately pressed into service to replace the old Bulldogs, which were finally withdrawn in early February; the entire order of Gladiators was on hand by mid-February. The delivery of thirty Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 monoplanes donated by France also occurred during February. In addition, beginning in early March, the Finns began to take delivery of the first of 44 Brewster F2A-1 (actually the B-239 export variant) Buffaloes purchased from the U.S. Navy and assembled in Sweden by Norwegian mechanics. Only a handful of these fighters, however, were available before the end of the conflict. Likewise, delivery of ten Hawker Hurricanes during early March came too late. Other assistance was provided beginning in early January by a Swedish detachment of a dozen Gladiators and four Hawker Hart light biplane bombers that operated in the Lapland region to the north. There were also a half dozen Danish volunteer fighter pilots who flew along side the Finns, as well as a few other foreign volunteers. US Navy Brewster F2A-1 Buffalo Of this mixed bag of fighter types, the Fokkers, primarily due to their larger numbers during the Winter War, were most successful, claiming a 16-to-1 kill ratio. Finnish claims were predominantly against Soviet bombers and, although all air-combat claims should be taken with much seasoning, theirs are probably more reliable than most, since a high percentage occurred over friendly territory where wreckage could be confirmed. Next in effectiveness, again primarily because of higher numbers available earlier in the conflict, were the Gladiators. Their claims were also predominantly against bombers, but the biplanes were more effective against the Russian fighters. Although relatively under-powered and slower than the Soviet monoplanes, the Gladiators could out-turn any of their opponents, which made them dangerous in a dogfight, especially against inexperienced pilots. Because of their better maneuverability, the Gladiators typically took off first and landed last in order to cover the takeoff and landing of the monoplanes. The shortcomings of the Gladiator were quickly evident, as their loss rate was alarming. Their light armament was only marginally effective against the armored Soviet aircraft and their lack of a firewall made them susceptible to flaming in the air. Neither were the Soviets standing still during this period. After initial heavy bomber losses, they introduced some 500 additional aircraft in January, and began to escort their bombers on a regular basis. Newer fighters were committed, including the I-153 biplanes and I-16 Type 18 monoplanes. At this time, the Red Air Force was concentrating on supporting their ground forces which had bogged down on the Karelian front. This I-153, just recently introduced and blooded in Mongolia, was described earlier in conjunction with its service against the Japanese. By the time of its introduction in Finland, however, most Chaikas were fitted with their intended powerplants comprising the 1000-hp Shvetsov M-62 radial engine with 2-speed supercharger, based on the Wright Cyclone R-1820G-5, and the AV-1 2-position hydraulic variable-pitch propeller. This was a brute of a fighter, as can be seen in Table 20-1. Among Finnish fighters at this point in the war, only the Gladiator was slightly more maneuverable; but the Chaika's big engine, more powerful than any available to the Finns, conferred superior performance in every other respect to the Finnish biplane. In fact, the Chaika was nearly as fast as the Finnish monoplanes. When employed properly, the I-153 was very effective during the Winter War. The I-16 Type 18, like most of the Chaikas, was powered by the M-62 engine. In addition, the Type 18 was the first Soviet fighter to be equipped with the new AV-1 propeller as standard equipment, although some earlier I-16 versions were retrofitted with this device. Russian I-16 monoplane fighter The Type 18, except for the new powerplant and the resulting higher weight, was otherwise very similar to the I-16 Type 10, still armed with four machine guns. Its speed was comparable to that of the best of the fighters available to the Finns, and it possessed the best climb performance in the theater. In addition, the Type 18's turn performance was as good as any of the Finnish monoplanes, but, of course, markedly inferior to the Gladiator. This combination of traits made the I-16 Type 18 probably the best Russian fighter of the Winter War. By mid-February, the newly arrived Finnish monoplane fighters began to play significant roles in the air war. The best of these was probably the Fiat G.50, which could claim title to the fastest fighter in the theater during this period, but only by a very slim, insignificant margin. Both the Fiat and the Morane M.S.406 had comparable top speeds and superior dive performance relative to even the best Russian fighters, but, as can be seen in Table 20-1, they were significantly under-powered by r comparison, which resulted in inferior climb performance. Also having slightly higher wing loadings than the I-16s, these imports suffered from inferior turn performance, particularly in sustained engagements during which they would tend to loose speed and altitude (i.e., energy) faster. To make matters worse, both fighters were not well designed for such cold weather, and had significant maintenance and operational problems. Alone among the more modern Finnish fighters, the Fiat's open cockpit also placed it's pilot in the same uncomfortable accommodations as his Soviet counterparts, and like most other fighters available to the Finns, it had no armor protection. The Morane did have light pilot seat armor, but it was found to be only marginally effective against Soviet ammunition. Italian made Fiat G.50 fighter in Finnish colours The somewhat improved top speeds of these new retractable-gear fighters was an advantage, however, in comparison with the Fokkers in running down Russian bombers; the greatest object of the Finns' attentions. Unlike the French version of the M.S.406, which sported an engine-mounted 20mm Hispano cannon firing through the prop hub, in the imported Moranes the cannon was replaced by a light 7.5mm Chatellerault machine gun to match the pair installed in the wings. With only three rifle-caliber guns, the Finnish Morane was well under-armed. The Fiats, on the other hand, were better equipped for dueling with bombers; the Italian fighters were fitted with a pair of synchronized 12.7mm Breda-SAFAT heavy machine guns in the cowl. These heavier weapons were much more effective against the armor protection of both the Soviet bombers and fighters. Along with committing increased numbers of aircraft, the Soviets modified their tactics somewhat after the first days of the conflict. Along with supporting their stalemated ground forces and bombing transportation facilities, they shifted much of their bombers' attentions to the Finnish fighter airfields...when they could be found. The Finns, in response, shifted operating locations often. The size of the Russian bomber formations also increased significantly, and they were escorted regularly. Later in the war it was not uncommon for raids of a hundred bombers to be mounted, with a like number of fighter escorts. In good weather, the Russians could operate as many as 1,000 sorties per day. The Finnish tactics called for the first interceptors on scene to engage the Soviet escort fighters, so those arriving later could have a clear go at the bombers. The Soviet bombers also began to fly at higher altitudes, which made interception more difficult, but also reduced bombing accuracy. There were, in addition, regular night bombing raids. The Fokkers attempted only one interception mission on a bright moonlit night. Without the aid of any sort of air direction system, however, this effort failed. A pair of Finnish Fokker D XXIs Because of their low numbers, the Fokkers flew mostly in pairs. Occasionally during large bomber raids or to protect ground operations, they mounted formations of 15-20, sometimes mixed with Gladiators. The fighter pairs normally patrolled in a fairly wide, nearly line-abreast formation, and typically attacked in trail. In addition to bomber interception the Finnish fighters flew protective patrols over their troops and engaged in ground strafing attacks. Their obsolete close-support aircraft could only operated effectively under conditions of air superiority. Even the fast Blenheim bombers were poorly protected and generally required fighter escort. As in most air conflicts over friendly territory, Finnish fighters were at considerable peril to ground fire from their own troops when operating at low altitudes. The Soviets, with the advantage of numbers, normally flew in much larger formations, typically 6-30 fighters. As they were usually on the offensive, the Russians often also enjoyed the initial altitude advantage. One of their favorite tactics was known as the "Spanish Circle," from its origins in the Spanish Civil War. A number of I-16s would form a circle over Finnish fighters, with each taking turns performing dive-and-zoom attacks. The Finns were forced to make continual hard defensive turns to defeat successive attacks from different directions, eventually running them out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas. The best defense was usually an early diving escape attempt. The Finnish fighters also adopted this tactic from the Soviets. Late in February, the Soviets committed about 500 additional aircraft to the Finnish campaign in preparation for a massive ground offensive, bringing their total to over 2,000 aircraft, including nearly a thousand bombers and about 500 fighters. This force represented nearly half the strength of the entire Red Air Force. Meanwhile, the FAF had grown to nearly 200 planes, with the average of better quality than at the start of the war, but the number serviceable remained fairly constant at nearer a hundred. At the end of February the Finns suffered their worst losses of any single engagement of the air war when the Soviets mounted a well-coordinated fighter attack on one of their major bases. Just as the mixed squadron of fifteen Fokkers and Gladiators was taking off to intercept a reported bomber raid, some 40 I-16s and I-153s converged on their field almost simultaneously from three directions for a strafing attack. In the wild, low-altitude melee that followed, the Finns lost five Gladiators and a Fokker, while confirming eight Russian fighters, including an I-153 by ground fire. Following this engagement the Finnish Gladiators were relegated to reconnaissance missions only. The following day the Russians began their final ground assault, and for the next two weeks the Finnish fighters were engaged primarily in strafing attacks for the first time, throwing in everything they had in an attempt to stem the Red tide surging across the ice of the Bay of Viipuri. Early in the offensive the element of surprise and poor weather prevented the Soviets from providing effective anti-aircraft fire or air cover for their troops, and these strafing attacks wreaked havoc. Later, however, Russian anti-aircraft increased greatly and the weather improved somewhat, allowing better fighter cover. These defenses, along with the ever-present "friendly fire" of Finnish ground troops, increased FAF loss rates. By mid-March it was obvious that the Soviet offensive could not be stopped, and the Finns were forced into an armistice, accepting the Russian terms. As a result, Finland lost substantially more territory than the Soviets had at first demanded, including Viipuri (Vyborg), their second largest city. During this short, but vicious conflict, the FAF reportedly lost 60-70 aircraft, about equally distributed between air and ground losses, plus about the same number severely damaged. In addition, the Swedes lost six planes. Soviet aircraft losses have been estimated at 700-900; the Finns actually claimed only r about 240 in air combat, with some 80 more "probables," while the ground forces claimed 330 downed. FAF claims were overwhelmingly against Russian bombers. Of the original Finnish Fokkers, only eleven were lost; nine to enemy action, one to "friendly" ground r fire, another in an operational accident. Most of the rest went on to serve again a little over a year later in the Continuation War. A Finnish Fokker pilot is walking to his fighter on a frozen lake The Winter War, although it lasted less than four months, illustrates some important points regarding air combat. One of the most important is that the numbers of aircraft on each side do not tell the whole story. In this conflict, the Soviets enjoyed an approximate 10-1 advantage in aircraft, but LOST aircraft in combat at roughly the same ratio. Still, they ultimately won the war. As we have seen in previous air wars, particularly in WW-I, quantity is typically much better correlated with the final outcome of a conflict than with aircraft exchange ratios. If the side with superior numbers is willing and able to make good on its losses, it can accomplish its goals in support of the overall effort and eventually achieve victory. The price, however, may be great. In this conflict, the Soviets had the overwhelming advantage of numbers, and at least parity, if not a slight edge in quality with respect to fighter designs for most of the war. In addition, they had the advantage of holding both the strategic and tactical initiative in most cases. This usually allowed them to benefit from the element of surprise, concentration of numbers during a given engagement, and an initial altitude advantage. Another plus was the combat experience, at least at higher command levels, of the Russians in Spain and the Far East. This latter advantage was more than offset, however, by an inefficient command structure, low morale, and a general lack of experience among aircrews during much of the conflict. The Finns, on the other hand, could also claim rough parity in fighter quality, a much higher overall level of aircrew training, high morale, and a more efficient and effective fighter employment doctrine. Also, as they typically were based much closer to the air action, the FAF could generate more combat sorties per aircraft than the Soviets, who were forced to waste much more time just transiting back and forth to the combat arena. This factor has a powerful force-multiplying effect on the "density" of aircraft that can be engaged in combat at any time with a given total number of aircraft. Operating mostly over friendly territory, the Finns were also less likely to lose downed aircrew; and those that survived returned to combat much wiser, with the effect of increasing the overall level of aircrew experience over time. The general availability of radios to the FAF was another important factor. Finnish Fokkers were normally equipped with indigenous P-12-17/1 radios. Flight leaders usually had very low-power transmitters with a range of only about 3 mi for coordinating within their flights, while the wingmen generally had only receivers. A system of trained air observers had been established before the Winter War, using telephones to call the squadron headquarters, which were equipped with radios for notifying airborne fighters. The telephone system was not well developed, however, which often resulted in significant sighting delays. Even though the Finns did not have a very effective air-direction system during the Winter War, they were often able to receive engagement and sighting reports that were valuable in allowing them to concentrate their limited forces where they were most needed. Although it is often dangerous to draw sweeping conclusions from limited air conflicts, the Winter War illustrates many critical principles that will be reinforced throughout the history of air combat. Back to Fighter History page

Home Latest Topic | Air Warfare | Conferences/Air Shows | Fighter Tactics | Fighter Aircraft | Missiles | Fighter Aviation Topic | Fighter History | Warbirds | Magazines | Current News | Links | Physiology | Photo Gallery | Bibliography | SIIVET - Wings | What's New J Lindberg. Copyright © 1997-2006 Fighter Tactics Academy. Revised: tammikuu 04, 2006.